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ABSTRACT
The first year of the presidency of Donald J. Trump brought attention to Section 4 of the Twenty-fifth Amendment,
the constitutional provision that allows the Vice President and a Cabinet majority to transfer presidential powers
and duties from a President who is “unable to discharge the powers and duties” of his office. Although the ensuing
media discussion included many thoughtful contributions, it also produced many mistaken assertions by scholars,
journalists and other commentators regarding the importance, scope, operation, and effect of Section 4. These
mistakes are troubling because they may produce enduring misunderstanding regarding a provision designed to
handle some of the most challenging, traumatic and contentious contingencies that might arise involving an
incapacitated President and the transfer of presidential powers and duties to the Vice President. The errors also
might provide material for political actors and their supporters to cite and use opportunistically to frustrate the
proper use of Section 4. This Article exposes and corrects some of the mistaken assertions that have recently
appeared in media discussions. It explores a range of textual, originalist, structural, pragmatic, and other
constitutional arguments to shed light on significant, but sometimes misunderstood, questions regarding the
importance, scope, operation, and effect of Section 4.
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INTRODUCTION
It was anticipated that 2017 would bring attention to the Twenty-fifth
Amendment to the Constitution. That provision, which addresses
presidential succession and inability and filling vice-presidential vacancies,
was ratified on February 10, 1967, which made 2017 its fiftieth anniversary.
Golden jubilees invite retrospection. They present occasions to look back, to
reflect on, sometimes to celebrate, past events, even those that generally
receive little recognition, like obscure provisions of America’s Constitution.
The Twenty-fifth’s fiftieth seemed likely to present an opportunity for a
multi-purpose reflection—part nostalgia, part review of the legislative
process and the people that produced the Amendment, part examination of
the strengths and weaknesses of America’s provisions regarding presidential
succession and inability, and part public education regarding the
Amendment’s four sections and the constructive role three of them had
already played in ensuring presidential continuity.1
Life has a way of upsetting plans, and it did in this instance. Political
events transformed the anniversary. The Twenty-fifth Amendment received
much, much greater media attention than anyone could have imagined, but
most of the discussion occurred for unanticipated reasons and with an
unforeseen focus. Instead of addressing the three sections that had handled
succession or inability contingencies or reform ideas, public conversation
targeted the Amendment’s Section 4, which provides for involuntarily
separating a President from the powers and duties of his office.2 Section 4
1

2

See, e.g., Joel K. Goldstein, Celebrating the 50th of the 25th Amendment!, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 10,
2017, 3:31 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/celebrating-the-50th-of-the-25thamendment_us_589e1bb7e4b080bf74f03bcc.
Section 4 reads as follows:
Whenever the Vice President and a majority of either the principal officers of the
executive departments or of such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit to
the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives
their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of
his office, the Vice President shall immediately assume the powers and duties of the office
as Acting President.
Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President pro tempore of the Senate
and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that no inability
exists, he shall resume the powers and duties of his office unless the Vice President and a
majority of either the principal officers of the executive department or of such other body
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will be discussed more specifically below but, in essence, it provides a means
whereby the Vice President and a majority of the Cabinet (unless Congress
replaces that group with a different body) can transfer presidential powers
and duties (but not the presidency) to the Vice President upon finding that
the President is unable to discharge them. Section 4 also contains provisions
whereby the President can seek to reclaim his powers upon asserting that he
is not disabled and his claim can be considered, initially by the Vice President
and Cabinet, and, if they believe he remains disabled, by Congress, before
he resumes power. What produced the recent preoccupation with Section 4
was neither an interest in exploring the Amendment’s past nor an effort to
improve it for the future, but a belief that present circumstances dictated that
the unused provision should now be put to use.
This unforeseen development was due, of course, to recurring questions
regarding whether President Donald J. Trump was “unable to discharge the
powers and duties of his office,” the standard Section 4 sets for its use. Those
concerns were aired even before his election and escalated during the first
year of his presidency as scholars, legislators, and journalists used
information age platforms to expound on whether Section 4 applied and, if
so, whether it should be invoked.
The unanticipated focus came at a cost. The preoccupation with the
Amendment’s one unused portion distracted from recalling the contributions
the other three parts have made and from considering remaining gaps in
America’s provisions for ensuring presidential and governmental continuity.
Section 1 had formalized the long-standing practice that the Vice President
became President (not simply acting President) for the remainder of the term
upon the death of the President and had extended that treatment to
presidential resignations and removals following impeachment, situations
involving permanent vacancies where the same logic applied.3 Section 2

3

as Congress may by law provide, transmit within four days to the President pro tempore
of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration
that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office. Thereupon
Congress shall decide the issue, assembling within forty-eight hours for that purpose if not
in session. If the Congress, within twenty-one days after receipt of the latter written
declaration, or, if Congress is not in session, within twenty-one days after Congress is
required to assemble, determines by two-thirds vote of both Houses that the President is
unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice President shall continue
to discharge the same as Acting President; otherwise, the President shall resume the powers
and duties of his office.
U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4. Although Section 4 allows Congress to replace the “principal
officers of the executive departments” (i.e., the Cabinet) with some “other body,” Congress has not
done so and accordingly this Article will generally discuss Section 4 as involving the Vice President
and the “principal officers” as the decision-makers. See infra Section II.D.
See Joel K. Goldstein, History and Constitutional Interpretation: Some Lessons from the Vice Presidency, 69
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recognized the enhanced importance of the vice presidency and created an
intra-term means to fill a vice-presidential vacancy rather than having to wait
for the next quadrennial election.4 That provision had facilitated the
impeachment process that led to the resignation of Richard M. Nixon in 1974
by providing a vehicle to fill the vacancy caused by Vice President Spiro T.
Agnew’s resignation in 1973 with a Republican, thereby preventing a shift in
partisan control of the White House which would have otherwise occurred
since the line of succession placed a Democratic Speaker of the House of
Representatives next in line of succession.5 And Section 3 had provided a
mechanism whereby presidents could voluntarily transfer presidential powers
for finite periods of time prior to planned surgery or for other such
incapacities. Two presidents had done so on three occasions,6 and four others
had planned to do so if medical procedures required general anesthesia.7
Distracting attention from this record was not the only, or even the
primary, cost of the Section 4 obsession during the first year or so of the Trump
presidency. Although some media articles provided thoughtful discussions of
whether Section 4 could or should be used to separate President Trump from
presidential powers and duties, many made mistaken assertions about the
Twenty-fifth Amendment, sometimes regarding rather basic matters.
By “mistaken assertions,” I am not talking about conclusions on the
ultimate question, whether or not Section 4 should be invoked regarding
President Trump. That topic is not the subject of this Article, and those

4

5
6

7

ARK. L. REV. 647, 679 (2016) (noting that the first section addresses “presidential death, resignation,
and removal”).
Joel K. Goldstein, The New Constitutional Vice Presidency, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 505, 507 (1995).
Section 2 provides: “Whenever there is a vacancy in the office of Vice President, the President shall
nominate a Vice President who shall take office upon confirmation by a majority vote of both
Houses of Congress.” U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 2.
John D. Feerick, Presidential Succession and Inability: Before and After the Twenty-fifth Amendment, 79
FORDHAM L. REV. 907, 932–33 (2010).
JOEL K. GOLDSTEIN, THE WHITE HOUSE VICE PRESIDENCY: THE PATH TO SIGNIFICANCE,
MONDALE TO BIDEN 255–59 (2016) (discussing transfers of power by Presidents Ronald Reagan
and George W. Bush). Section 3 provides:
Whenever the President transmits to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to
discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a written
declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice
President as Acting President.
U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 3.
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 6 at 255, 258–59 (discussing plans to invoke Section 3 in Administrations
of Presidents Jimmy Carter, George H.W. Bush, and Bill Clinton); Second Fordham University
School of Law Clinic on Presidential Succession, Report: Fifty Years After the Twenty-fifth Amendment:
Recommendations for Improving the Presidential Succession System, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 917, 926–27 (2017)
(noting discussion of invoking Section 3 before medical procedures of Presidents Jimmy Carter,
George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and Barack Obama).
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interested in that specific question might prefer to read elsewhere. The
“mistaken assertions” rather related to misstatements regarding basic aspects
about the history, scope, and operation of Section 4. The errors sometimes
related to matters peripheral to an author’s focus, sometimes in otherwise
thoughtful columns. Some errors may have been casualties of the tight
deadlines and word limits journalism imposes, time and space constraints from
which academics are often sheltered. Some mistakes may have occurred when
commentators rushed a short piece to print without having fully reviewed the
record that produced the Amendment or the surrounding literature.
The mistakes are troubling nonetheless. Some communicated confusing
and inaccurate information and created an enduring source of erroneous
data and ideas. Although this risk existed ever since the printing press
allowed mass production of media and since old articles were available at
newspaper and magazine morgues, at archives and on microfilm, the hazard
has increased exponentially in the Internet age when information and
misinformation is disseminated around the world quickly and when search
engines can easily retrieve prior comments and columns in seconds. Such
mistakes may mislead not only contemporary readers but those who may
access, rely on, and repeat the errors in the future. The mistakes made by
scholars are most troubling since journalists and readers may assume their
assertions are based on expertise regarding the Twenty-fifth Amendment,
and future decision-makers and their supporters may rely on, or
opportunistically cite, inaccurate statements to support future behavior. The
mistakes also reflected, and contributed to, a misunderstanding of the
significance of the contribution the Twenty-fifth Amendment represented.
Worse still, the mistakes relate to the continuity of presidential leadership,
a topic that clearly matters.8 The Twenty-fifth Amendment rested on a
consensus that America must always have a functioning President in a
nuclear age.9 The Section 4 procedures, though least likely to be used, cover
situations that are most likely to arise in times of crisis and contention.
Accordingly, the Amendment must be well understood. Incorrect
information must be discredited during normal times so implementation of
the Amendment can proceed appropriately when the need arises for its use
in what are likely to be times of some national trauma.

8

9

YALE LAW SCHOOL RULE OF LAW CLINIC, THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION: A READER’S GUIDE 5 (2018) (stating that “issues of presidential inability
raise questions of the utmost gravity”).
Joel K. Goldstein, Taking from the Twenty-fifth Amendment: Lessons in Ensuring Presidential Continuity, 79
FORDHAM L. REV. 959, 964 (2010); Rebecca C. Lubot, “A Dr. Strangelove Situation”: Nuclear Anxiety,
Presidential Fallibility, and the Twenty-fifth Amendment, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 1175, 1176–77 (2017).
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The mistaken assertions about Section 4 during recent discussions are
significant. For instance, it has been suggested that the presidential inability
provisions were peripheral to the Amendment. They were not. Sections 3
and 4 were of at least equal importance to the provisions dealing with
presidential succession and vice-presidential vacancy. Some have said that
mental illness was not a primary target of the presidential inability provisions.
It was. The legislative record makes clear that the framers of the Amendment
fully intended to cover that vexing problem, including mental illness that
occurred independent of an attack or acute, physical event. Some have
suggested that Section 4 only applies when a President is unable to transfer
power voluntarily, not when he is unwilling to acknowledge a disability. In
fact, the broad textual language and the legislative record make clear that
Section 4 applies to situations where a disabled President is unwilling to
recognize and declare his or her inability in addition to instances where the
President is unable to do so. Some criticize Section 4 as ambiguous regarding
who acts with the Vice President and in the standard it provides. In fact, the
record resolves most issues regarding the identity of the “principal officers of
the executive departments” and any ambiguity in the “unable to discharge
the powers and duties of” the presidency standard was deliberate and
represented a preference for flexibility and a faith in future decision-makers.
Contrary to frequent mischaracterizations, Section 4 does not provide an
instrument to remove the President from office, or to transfer his or her
powers permanently (although that could be the de facto result if the
President’s incapacity is permanent). And contrary to occasional suggestions,
the Amendment’s text and legislative history make very clear that once a
President is declared disabled under Section 4, the Vice President continues
to act as President until some authoritative decision-maker (i.e. the Vice
President, a majority of the Cabinet or “other body” empowered to act with
him or her, or Congress), but not the President alone, determines that he or
she is able to resume powers.
This Article corrects some recent misstatements about Section 4 that
might have credibility based on the commentator who voiced them or the
platform from which they were expressed. It does so by discussing the
Amendment’s text, legislative record and surrounding history, and structural
and pragmatic arguments. As such, this Article offers a resource to inform
future considerations of Section 4 of the Twenty-fifth Amendment by
furnishing not simply an interpretive guide to some important questions but
a source of constitutional arguments and historical information.
This Article begins by outlining some of the discussion in the media
regarding Section 4 of the Twenty-fifth Amendment in connection with
President Trump. It then presents some common mistaken assertions about
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Section 4 and uses textual and structural arguments and historical materials
to correct the record. The final section offers conclusions.
I. MEDIA DISCUSSIONS OF DECLARING PRESIDENT TRUMP DISABLED
Section 4 of the Twenty-fifth Amendment received little discussion until
recently. Although some scholarly works discussed it,10 the provision received
virtually no consideration in constitutional law casebooks11 and its scant
media discussion generally occurred when it was under consideration or
ratified. Occasionally, an ideological critic of a prior President would suggest
invoking Section 4,12 but those instances were exceptional and sporadic.
That has recently changed, thanks to perceptions in some circles
regarding President Trump. Discussion of using Section 4 began even before
the 2016 election. In August 2016, The Hill carried a column predicting that
Americans would need to become familiar with Section 4 if Trump were
elected.13 In another pre-election piece, former Senator Gordon Humphrey,
a Republican conservative, argued that Section 4 applied to Trump and
suggested that Republican electors abandon him.14 Only eight days after the
2016 popular vote election day, David Frum, a conservative former
speechwriter for President George W. Bush, predicted that Section 4 would

10

11

12

13

14

See, e.g., JOHN D. FEERICK, THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT: ITS COMPLETE HISTORY AND
APPLICATIONS (3d ed. 2014) (analyzing the sections of the Twenty-fifth Amendment); MANAGING
CRISIS: PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY AND THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT (Robert E. Gilbert
ed., 2000) (discussing the Twenty-fifth Amendment’s history and the Amendment’s strengths and
weakness); JAMES M. RONAN, LIVING DANGEROUSLY: THE UNCERTAINTIES OF PRESIDENTIAL
DISABILITY AND SUCCESSION (2015) (explaining why Section 4 was not invoked in certain
administrations).
See, e.g., PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND
MATERIALS 541 (6th ed. 2014) (including a one paragraph discussion of presidential inability in the
context of discussing impeachment); JESSE H. CHOPER ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES,
COMMENTS, AND QUESTIONS 271–74 (12th ed. 2015) (discussing impeachment and removal but
not presidential inability); NORMAN REDLICH, JOHN B. ATTANASIO & JOEL K. GOLDSTEIN,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 323 (5th ed. 2008) (including two paragraphs on Twenty-fifth
Amendment); GEOFFREY A. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1656, 1660 (8th ed. 2018)
(including no Index entry for “Twenty-fifth Amendment” or “presidential inability”).
See, e.g., Charles Hurt, Opinion, Has the President Lost His Ability to Discharge the Powers and Duties of
Office?, WASH. TIMES (Dec. 1, 2015), https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/dec/1/
charles-hurt-obama-loses-gift-of-speech-in-paris-t/ (criticizing President Barack Obama and
calling for removal).
Ben Brenkert, Better Brush up on the 25th Amendment if Trump Wins, HILL (Aug. 3, 2016, 10:05 AM),
http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/presidential-campaign/290204-better-brush-up-on-the25th-amendment-if-trump-wins.
Gordon Humphrey, Trump Is a Creep, WKLY. STANDARD (Oct. 8, 2016, 2:08 PM),
https://www.weeklystandard.com/gordon-humphrey/trump-is-a-creep.
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become a topic of widespread discussion.15 Eleven days before Trump’s
inauguration, the Washington Post’s liberal columnist Richard Cohen urged
senators to question Trump’s Cabinet nominees regarding their awareness
of, and willingness to invoke, Section 4.16
The frequency and volume of such discussion increased in the Trump
Administration’s early days. Frum tweeted about the subject a few days after
Trump’s inauguration.17 The headline for a column by journalist Heather
Digby Parton on January 25, 2017, advised that Trump could be “deposed”
via the Twenty-fifth Amendment18 and one over a CBS News explanatory
piece the next day referred to “[a]n obscure way to oust an American
president,” suggesting the novelty of the proposition.19 Eliot A. Cohen, a
counselor in the George W. Bush state department, wrote during Trump’s
first ten days in office that “[i]t will not be surprising in the slightest if
[Trump’s] term ends not in four or in eight years, but sooner, with
impeachment or removal under the 25th Amendment.”20 On February 10,
2017, the fiftieth anniversary of the ratification of the Amendment, the
Washington Post’s conservative columnist Kathleen Parker suggested that
Section 4 could be used to separate Trump from presidential powers and

15

16

17

18

19
20

David
Frum
(@davidfrum),
TWITTER
(Nov.
16,
2016,
5:27
AM),
https://twitter.com/davidfrum/status/798880228923871233 (noting that “Twenty-Fifth
Amendment to the Constitution. Article [sic] 4. We’re all going to be talking a lot more about it in
the months ahead.”); see also Tim Marcin, How to Keep Trump from Becoming President? 25th Amendment
Could Declare Republican Mentally Unfit, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Nov. 28, 2016, 11:37 AM),
http://www.ibtimes.com/how-keep-trump-becoming-president-25th-amendment-could-declarerepublican-mentally-2451687 (noting that discussion had started about Section 4 shortly after
President Trump’s election).
Richard Cohen, How to Remove Trump from Office, WASH. POST (Jan. 9, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/how-to-remove-trump-from-office/2017/01/09/
e119cc36-d698-11e6-9a36-1d296534b31e_story.html?utm_term=.0aa71173d2b1;
see
also
Lawrence M. Friedman & David M. Siegel, The Most Important Qualification for a Post in President Trump’s
Cabinet, NEW ENG. L. REV. FORUM (Feb. 15, 2017), https://newenglrev.com/tag/david-siegel
(discussing the importance of Cabinet members to be willing to fulfill responsibilities under the
Twenty-fifth Amendment and the failure of senators to question Cabinet nominees on the subject).
David Frum (@davidfrum), TWITTER (JAN. 25, 2017, 8:46 AM), https://twitter.com/davidfrum/
status/824252174020517888 (stating “I wonder how Mike Pence’s 25th amendment vote counting
operation is going today.”).
Heather Digby Parton, Don’t Look Now: It’s President Pence! Donald Trump Can Be Deposed Even Without
Impeachment, SALON (Jan. 25, 2017, 1:01 PM), https://www.salon.com/2017/01/25/dont-looknow-its-president-pence-donald-trump-can-be-deposed-even-without-impeachment/.
Will Rahn, Commentary: An Obscure Way to Oust an American President, CBS NEWS (Jan. 26, 2017, 6:00
AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/an-obscure-way-to-oust-an-american-president/.
Eliot A. Cohen, A Clarifying Moment in American History, ATLANTIC (Jan. 29, 2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/01/a-clarifying-moment-in-americanhistory/514868/.
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duties.21 A week later, MSNBC’s Steve Benen reported on “scuttlebutt” in
the media and on Capitol Hill about Trump’s capacity but cautioned
Trump’s critics to “keep your expectations low.”22 Conservative columnist
Byron York summarized the discussion but dismissed Section 4 proponents
as “The Resistance.”23
Just as some from the Republican right suggested applying Section 4 to
Trump, some linked to the Democratic left debunked the idea. In late March
2017, Jeff Greenfield, a former aide to Senator Robert F. Kennedy and a
prominent political commentator, dismissed the prospect of using Section 4
against Trump as “misguided” and a “liberal fantasy.”24 Greenfield argued
that it was “beyond absurdity” to think that Vice President Mike Pence and
Trump’s Cabinet would deem the President unfit. Moreover, Section 4 was
an emergency provision which would be used for a President who was
“unable to communicate, or curled up in a fugue state” but would otherwise
be relegated to Hollywood scripts and novels.25 An explainer piece by
journalist Evan Osnos suggested that absent an unconscious President, use
of Section 4 could be viewed as a coup and accordingly impeachment was “a
more promising tool for curtailing a defective Presidency.”26
Sometimes events intensified Section 4 discussion. Shortly after President
Trump fired FBI director James Comey, New York Times conservative
columnist Ross Douthat lamented Trump’s unfitness but dismissed talk of
Section 4 as “noise,” since it was unrealistic to think that Pence or
congressional Republicans would act to transfer powers.27 But three days
later, Trump’s behavior caused Douthat to change his tune. A new column
concluded that Trump lacked the characteristics needed in a President and

21

22

23

24

25
26
27

Kathleen Parker, Trump’s Two-year Presidency, WASH. POST (Feb. 10, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/trumps-two-year-presidency/2017/02/10/
32c2e4ce-efd9-11e6-9973-c5efb7ccfb0d_story.html?utm_term=.baa8e2e5f9fc.
Steve Benen, Why the 25th Amendment Is Suddenly Getting So Much Attention, MSNBC: MADDOWBLOG
(Feb. 17, 2017, 4:02 PM), http://www.msnbc.com/rachel-maddow-show/why-the-25th-amendmentsuddenly-getting-so-much-attention.
Byron York, Opinion, 25th Amendment Chatter: Dems, Pundits Mull Ways to Remove Trump, WASH.
EXAM’R (Feb. 17, 2017, 7:15 PM), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/byron-york-25thamendment-chatter-dems-pundits-mull-ways-to-remove-trump/article/2615212.
Jeff Greenfield, A Liberal Fantasy Ripped from a Hollywood Script, POLITICO (Mar. 29, 2017),
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/03/25th-amendment-trump-cabinet-removeoffice-president-fantasy-214965.
Id.
Evan Osnos, How Trump Could Get Fired, NEW YORKER (May 8, 2017),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/05/08/how-trump-could-get-fired.
Ross Douthat, Opinion, Donald Trump Does Not Surprise, N.Y. TIMES (May 13, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/13/opinion/donald-trump-does-not-surprise.html.
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did not understand his office.28 Douthat now recommended that Pence and
Trump’s Cabinet consider Section 4, although he acknowledged that the
situation he described was not what the Amendment’s framers envisioned.29
Around the time of Douthat’s columns, Professor Jamal Greene of
Columbia Law School thought Trump’s “complete lack of trustworthiness
and his manifest incompetence” as reflected in the Comey firing “may be of
constitutional significance.”30 The Amendment seemed to envision that
Section 4 could apply to a “lucid” President and Greene argued that “a
compulsively lying President” was unable to discharge presidential powers.31
Greene did not, however, expect Section 4 decision-makers to utilize that
remedy,32 and others also thought its use was unlikely, impractical or
improper. Dahlia Lithwick argued that Pence and the Cabinet would never
declare Trump disabled and thought the real problem was that someone with
his qualities could be elected President in the first place.33 National Review’s
Ian Tuttle thought Trump was a “menace” but argued that removing him
via Section 4 would be improper and counterproductive.34 Bloomberg’s
Jonathan Bernstein believed Trump unfit to be President but thought that
the “armchair diagnoses” of Trump’s mental illness did not “clear the
constitutional bar.”35 Impeachment and removal, not Section 4, was the
appropriate remedy.36 Jeffrey Rosen provided a lengthy explainer piece in
which he concluded that Section 4 made presidential inability a political, not
medical, question which was to apply to “presidents who were clearly and
unequivocally incapacitated,” “in other words, terminally ill, in a coma, near
28
29
30
31
32
33

34

35

36

Ross Douthat, Opinion, The 25th Amendment Solution for Removing Trump, N.Y. TIMES (May 16, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/16/opinion/25th-amendment-trump.html?_r=0.
Id.
Jamal Greene, Trump, Trust, and the 25th Amendment, TAKE CARE (May 15, 2017),
https://takecareblog.com/blog/trump-trust-and-the-25th-amendment.
Id.
Id.
Dahlia Lithwick, Is Donald Trump Too Incapacitated to be President? SLATE (May 17, 2017, 6:17 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2017/05/no_the_25th_amendment_i
s_not_the_solution.html.
Ian Tuttle, Against the ‘25th Amendment Option,’ NAT’L REVIEW (May 18, 2017, 8:00 AM),
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/447731/25th-amendment-donald-trump-ross-douthatsargument-falls-short; see also Richard Brodsky, The ‘25th Amendment Solution’ Is a Terrible,
Dangerous
Idea,
H UFFINGTON
P OST
(May
17,
2017,
11:06
AM),
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/the-new-and-dangerous-republican-plan-toremove-trump_us_591c66a7e4b0a8551f3f84be (arguing that Trump supporters knew of
“his personality, his infinite capacity for lies and self-deception” when they elected him).
Jonathan Bernstein, No, the 25th Amendment Isn’t the Way to Boot Trump, BLOOMBERG (May 17, 2017,
7:39 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-05-17/no-the-25th-amendment-isnt-the-way-to-boot-trump.
Id.
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death, or severely mentally incapacitated.”37 Columnist (and former George
W. Bush aide) Michael Gerson thought America might have “an unbalanced
president” but concluded that invoking Section 4 was “a practical
impossibility” because it would require participation of Trump’s Cabinet.38
Conservative Washington Post columnist Jennifer Rubin thought Douthat’s
suggestion inconsistent with the true purpose of the Amendment and warned
against medicalizing “amoral, stupid and/or illegal behavior.”39
Autumn 2017 brought a renewed burst of Section 4 discussion following
reports that Senator Bob Corker, the Republican chair of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, stood by earlier concerns about Trump’s stability and
referred to the White House as “an adult day care center”40 and that
Secretary of State Rex Tillerson had called the President a “moron.”41
Jennifer Rubin thought Section 4 should not be invoked lightly and repeated
the earlier admonition against medicalizing political disagreements but
wondered whether President Trump’s behavior put the country “there yet”
or “close.”42 Princeton historian Julian Zelizer expressed misgivings about
using Section 4 to transfer powers from Trump but thought that further
evidence that Trump was “psychologically unfit to handle the duties” of the
presidency would oblige Pence and Cabinet officials to act to protect the
nation.43
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Jeffrey Rosen, The 25th Amendment Makes Presidential Disability a Political Question, ATLANTIC (May 23,
2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/05/presidential-disability-is-apolitical-question/527703/.
Michael Gerson, Opinion, How to Handle an Unhinged President, WASH. POST (July 6, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/how-to-handle-an-unhinged-president/2017/07/
06/88b2ec38-628b-11e7-8adc-fea80e32bf47_story.html?utm_term=.c31e6fddaeae.
Jennifer Rubin, Opinion, Let’s be Clear About What the 25th Amendment Does and Doesn’t Do, WASH.
POST (May 17, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/right-turn/wp/2017/05/17/letsbe-clear-about-what-the-25th-amendment-does-and-doesnt-do/?utm_term=.11c2f640a157.
Philip Rucker & Karen Demirjian, Corker Calls White House ‘an Adult Day Care Center’ in Response to
Trump’s
Latest
Twitter
Tirade,
WASH.
POST
(Oct.
8,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2017/10/08/trump-attacks-gop-sencorker-didnt-have-the-guts-to-run-for-reelection/?utm_term=.fbf7fdafb0c3.
Gabriel Sherman, “I Hate Everyone in the White House!”: Trump Seethes as Advisers Fear the President Is
“Unraveling,”
VANITY
FAIR
(Oct.
11,
2017,
2:40
PM),
https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2017/10/donald-trump-is-unraveling-white-house-advisers.
Jennifer Rubin, Opinion, When Do We Reach 25th Amendment Territory?, WASH. POST (Oct. 12, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/right-turn/wp/2017/10/12/when-do-we-reach-25thamendment-territory/?utm_term=.a7e4a5ba0486.
Julian
Zelizer,
Is
It
Time
to
Talk
About
the
25th
Amendment?,
CNN,
https://www.cnn.com/2017/10/13/opinions/is-it-time-to-talk-the-25th-amendment-opinionzelizer/index.html (last updated Oct. 16, 2017, 10:02 AM).
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Some concluded that conventional interpretations did not make
Section 4 an instrument to use against Trump but favored its expansion to
serve that purpose. For instance, Professor Eric Posner of the University of
Chicago School of Law wrote that the Constitution is defective because
under the “conventional understanding” of the Amendment, a President can
be removed if “incapacitated by mental or physical illness” but not if he had
lost public confidence due to “a failure of temperament, ideology or
ability.”44 Posner argued that its “broad language” deliberately transcends
physical and mental incapacities and should be construed more broadly.
Additionally, Posner argued that Congress should create a bipartisan
Presidential Oversight Council to recommend removal for inability on
political rather than medical grounds.45
In mid-October Harvard Law professor Jeannie Suk Gersen described
the activity of some medical health professionals who had organized “Duty
to Warn,” an organization that claimed that Trump suffered from “incurable
malignant narcissism” that rendered him unable to discharge presidential
powers and duties. In view of this unusual activity, she thought “talk of
Trump’s removal under the Twenty-fifth Amendment may not seem so
crazy.”46
Law professor Jonathan Turley responded to arguments such as those
Douthat, Posner, and Duty to Warn participants had made in two overlapping columns. One argued that “removing Trump” through Section 4
“would be a disaster for our system.” Turley discounted claims that Trump
should be removed for “incurable malignant narcissism,” since many public
servants are narcissists, presidents should not be declared unfit without an
examination, and Trump’s objectionable traits were evident before the
November election.47 Bad behavior is not the test under Section 4, Turley
pointed out; inability to discharge presidential powers and duties is.

44
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Eric Posner, Opinion, Trump Could Be Removed for Political Incompetence – Using the 25th Amendment,
WASH. POST (Sept. 12, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/trump-could-beremoved-for-political-incompetence--using-the-25th-amendment/2017/09/12/b6c62380-971811e7-82e4-f1076f6d6152_story.html?utm_term=.0dbf9e5eeb66 .
Id.
Jeannie Suk Gersen, How Anti-Trump Psychiatrists Are Mobilizing Behind the Twenty-fifth Amendment, NEW
YORKER (Oct. 16, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/how-anti-trumppsychiatrists-are-mobilizing-behind-the-twenty-fifth-amendment.
Jonathan Turley, How Do You Get Rid of Trump? An Election, Not the 25th Amendment, WASH. POST (Oct.
19, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/posteverything/wp/2017/10/19/how-doyou-get-rid-of-trump-an-election-not-the-25thamendment/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.6052a3d59ca9.
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A second Turley column said the growing “25 and over” club saw
Section 4 “as a way to prematurely . . . end” Trump’s Administration by
declaring Trump mentally ill and “thus unfit to hold office.”48 Turley
derided the idea that Pence and a Cabinet majority would declare Trump
disabled but his column mostly attacked the propriety, not the plausibility, of
using Section 4.49 Among other points, he observed that authoritarian
regimes deploy allegations of mental illness as a political weapon and argued
that mental illness should not be diagnosed without an examination,
concluded that evidence of Trump’s mental illness was lacking, and noted
that mental illness is not necessarily disabling nor is it a justification for
“removal” under Section 4 which requires a finding that the President is
unable to discharge presidential powers and duties.50
The debate continued. The distinguished presidential historian, Robert
Dallek, shared Posner’s belief that Section 4 should be construed to extend
beyond the maladies that inspired its creation. He wrote in December 2017
that Trump should be declared unable to discharge the powers and duties of
his office based on an expanded conception of Section 4 which looks to his
level of competence rather than for a medical impairment. Dallek contended
that Trump is untrustworthy, lies, and has credibly been accused of sexual
misconduct.51 By December 2017, Section 4 was receiving so much attention
that the New York Times ran an opinion piece recommending various books
dealing with presidential inability as holiday gifts.52
The publication in January 2018 of Michael Wolff’s Fire and Fury: Inside
the Trump White House, with its report that Trump insiders discussed Trump’s
fitness, triggered another round of Section 4 discussion. President Trump
tweeted about his “mental stability” and termed himself a genius . . . and a
very stable genius at that!”53 Jennifer Rubin now questioned the President’s
fitness and declared that Pence, the Cabinet, and Congress “have a moral
and constitutional obligation to bring this to a stop.”54 In January 2018,
48

49
50
51
52
53
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Jonathan Turley, Opinion, Sorry Folks, Trump Is Not Insane, HILL (Oct. 24, 2017, 10:00 AM),
http://thehill.com/opinion/white-house/356842-trump-pales-in-comparison-to-our-history-ofmentally-ill-presidents.
Id.
Id.
Robert Dallek, Is Trump Unfit for Office? The Constitution Says Yes, NEWSWEEK (Dec. 16, 2017, 6:00
AM), http://www.newsweek.com/trump-25th-amendment-constitution-750157.
Sarah Vowell, Opinion, Presidential Incapacity: A Holiday Gift Guide, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 21, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/21/opinion/trump-holiday-gift-guide.html.
Andrew Restuccia & Craig Howie, Trump Defends Mental Health: ‘I’m a Stable Genius,’ POLITICO (Jan.
6, 2018, 7:42 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/01/06/trump-wolff-mental-health327116.
Jennifer Rubin, Opinion, The ‘Stable Genius’ Isn’t Even Functioning as President, WASH. POST (Jan. 6,
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CNN’s Byron Wolf noted that the Amendment was “back in the news” but
thought it “hard to imagine” that the decision-makers would invoke it against
Trump.55 But constitutional scholar Mark Graber argued that Trump was
“constitutionally unfit” to serve as President, that Section 4 did not turn on
physical or medical disability, that Trump was a “congenital liar and a
bigot,” and as such he was “unable to discharge the powers and duties of [the
presidency].”56 Law professor Michael Ramsey rejected Graber’s analysis,
which, he said, conflated “unfit” with “unable.” Section 4 covered the latter,
not the former, he argued.57
Media discussion of Section 4 in connection with Trump subsided after
Trump’s White House physician, Dr. Ronny Jackson, issued a glowing
report of Trump’s physical and cognitive health in mid-January 2018.58 Yet
the topic returned to prominence in early September 2018 when an
anonymous writer, who the New York Times identified as a “senior official
in the Trump administration,” contributed a commentary piece alleging that
various officials, including the writer, had resisted Trump’s “erratic
behavior” and that the “instability” Trump’s subordinates had witnessed had
prompted “early whispers within the cabinet of invoking the 25th
Amendment,” a move that had not been pursued in order to avert a
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2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/right-turn/wp/2018/01/06/the-stable-geniusisnt-even-functioning-as-president/?utm_term=.3c440abbb611.
Z. Byron Wolf, Removing a President Using the 25th Amendment Would Require a Political Apocalypse, CNN,
https://www.cnn.com/2018/01/08/politics/25th-amendment-would-require-a-politicalapocalypse/index.html (last updated Jan. 8, 2018, 1:12 PM); see also Will Rahn, Commentary: Why the
25th Amendment Won’t Be Used to Remove Trump, CBS NEWS (Jan. 11, 2018, 5:59 AM),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/why-the-25th-amendment-wont-be-used-to-remove-trump/
(arguing that use of Section 4 to transfer presidential powers and duties from Trump is unlikely);
Editorial, Is Mr. Trump Nuts?, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 10, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/10/
opinion/is-mr-trump-nuts.html (arguing that Trump was unfit to be President but rejecting
Section 4 as the appropriate remedy).
Mark Graber, Taking the Text of the Twenty-fifth Amendment Seriously, BALKINIZATION (Jan. 12, 2018),
https://balkin.blogspot.com/2018/01/taking-text-of-twenty-fifth-amendment.html.
Michael Ramsey, Mark Graber on the Twenty Fifth Amendment, ORIGINALISM BLOG (Jan. 15, 2018),
http://originalismblog.typepad.com/the-originalism-blog/2018/01/mark-graber-on-the-twentyfifth-amendmentmichael-ramsey.html.
Dan Merica, Dr. Ronny Jackson’s Glowing Bill of Health for Trump, CNN,
https://www.cnn.com/2018/01/16/politics/dr-ronny-jackson-donald-trump-clean-bill-ofhealth/index.html
(last updated Jan. 16, 2018, 11:03 PM). President Trump subsequently
nominated Dr. Jackson to be Secretary of Veterans Affairs. Veterans Affairs Pick Ronny Jackson
Impressed Trump After He Gave Glowing Health Report, CBSNEWS (Mar. 29, 2018, 7:40 AM),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/veterans-affairs-pick-ronny-jackson-impressed-trump-after-hegave-glowing-health-report/. But Dr. Jackson withdrew after his nomination became controversial
amidst allegations of improprieties.
Jessica Taylor, Ronny Jackson Withdraws as VA Nominee, NPR
(Apr. 26, 2018, 8:03 AM), https://www.npr.org/2018/04/26/605471807/dr-ronny-jacksonwithdraws-as-va-nominee.
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“constitutional crisis.”59
Various senior officials in the Trump
Administration denied authorship60 and that any discussion of using
Section 4 had occurred.61 Scholars and journalists produced another round
of explainer and commentary pieces about the Twenty-fifth Amendment or
Section 4.62
II. SETTING THE RECORD STRAIGHT
Although the media treatments provided some astute insights, some also
included mistakes regarding the history, scope, and operation of Section 4.
The discussion below seeks to correct the record on some important points
that may become relevant in the future.
Before presenting this discussion, it is worth saying something about the
methodology used. Some of the mistaken statements addressed the behavior
of the framers of the Twenty-fifth Amendment, whereas others made claims
about the meaning of Section 4. The former group, which include the claims
that the presidential inability provisions were peripheral and that the framers
did not intend mental illness to be covered (although that assertion also goes
to meaning), essentially involve statements regarding conduct and
accordingly are addressed largely by presenting historical evidence of actions
and words which demonstrate that the assertions are incorrect.
59

60

61

62

Opinion, I Am Part of the Resistance Inside the Trump Administration, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 5, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/05/opinion/trump-white-house-anonymousresistance.html.
Veronica Stracqualursi, Jeff Zeleny, & Jim Acosta, Here Are the Administration Officials Who Deny They
Wrote the New York Times Op-ed, CNN, https://www.cnn.com/2018/09/06/politics/trump-officialsdenials-nyt-op-ed/index.html (last updated Sept. 8, 2018, 5:01 PM).
Helena Bottemiller Evich, Perdue Dismisses 25th Amendment Chatter, POLITICO (Sept. 7, 2018, 6:00
PM),
https://www.politico.com/story/2018/09/07/perdue-trump-25th-amendment-talk811253; Quint Forgey, Pence Denies 25th Amendment Talks to Oust Trump Following NYT Op-ed’s Claim,
POLITICO (Sept. 8, 2018, 6:31 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/09/08/pence-trump25th-amendment-op-ed-812295.
See, e.g., Alan Blinder, The Story of the 25th Amendment, According to the People Behind It, N.Y. TIMES (Sept.
7, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/07/us/25th-amendment-trump.html (describing
creation of purposes of Amendment based on interviews with three participants); David Greenberg
& Rebecca Lubot, Stop Talking About the 25th Amendment. It Won’t Work on Trump, POLITICO (Sept. 8,
2018),
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/09/08/trump-25th-amendmentconstitutional-crisis-219739 (arguing that Section 4 does not apply to current situation); John
Hudak, How Donald Trump Could Tweet His Way Out of a 25th Amendment Challenge, BROOKINGS:
FIXGOV (Sept. 7, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2018/09/07/how-donaldtrump-could-tweet-his-way-out-of-a-25th-amendment-challenge/?; Michael D. Shear, The 25th
Amendment: The Difficult Process to Remove a President, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/06/us/politics/trump-25th-amendment-anonymous.html
(describing operation of Twenty-fifth Amendment).
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Consideration of claims regarding the meaning of Section 4 requires
making assumptions regarding proper methods of constitutional interpretation
as well as regarding several related areas, such as the role of text and purpose
in constitutional interpretation, how to perform originalist analysis, and the
relevance of evidence of legislative history. The literature in each of these areas
is massive and resists distillation even in writings about such subjects, much less
in an article like this one about an entirely different topic.
The discussion below relating to assertions regarding the meaning of
Section 4 draws from a range of modes of constitutional argument and
justification including text, originalism, structure, consequentialism, ongoing
history, and judicial precedent. These types of constitutional argument are
among those that judges and other authoritative constitutional interpreters
commonly use and enjoy widespread acceptance in the academic literature,63
even though certain constitutional interpreters argue that some are entitled
to priority over others.64 Recourse to a variety of constitutional arguments
often helps shed light on constitutional meaning especially when multiple
paths lead to the same result.
The discussion regarding the meaning of Section 4 draws heavily on
legislative history and accordingly implicates debates regarding the proper
way to perform originalist argument, whether based on original intentions,
original understandings, or original public meaning, and regarding the use
of legislative history to shed light on texts. Legislative history can illuminate
the context in which constitutional text is produced and accordingly offer
insights regarding meaning.65 Moreover, evidence regarding intent and
purpose often helps discern meaning.66 The use of legislative history that
63

64

65

66

See, e.g., JOHN B. ATTANASIO & JOEL K. GOLDSTEIN, UNDERSTANDING CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 9–
21 (4th ed. 2012); PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 3–9
(1982); PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 12 (1991); CHARLES A. MILLER, THE
SUPREME COURT AND THE USES OF HISTORY 14–28 (1969); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist
Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1194–1209 (1987).
See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF
LIBERTY 91–125 (2004) (advocating for an originalist textual interpretation); KEITH E.
WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT,
AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 1–17 (1999) (advocating that original intent is the most appropriate mode
of constitutional interpretation); Clarence Thomas, Judging, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 6 (1996)
(advocating originalism as the only means consistent with judicial impartiality).
See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Many and Varied Roles of History in Constitutional Adjudication, 90 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1753, 1761 (2015) (“Because meaning depends on context, in law as elsewhere, the
history of the drafting and ratification of constitutional provisions often has vital importance.”).
Id. at 1763–64 (“In nearly all contexts, the identifiable intentions or purposes of a speaker function
as an important indicator of the meaning of the speaker’s utterances.”); id. at 1764–66 (“Even those
who recurrently reject claims that legislatures can have intention analogous to those of individuals
attach interpretive significance to the widely shared purposes that motivated the adoption of
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follows is consistent not simply with arguments based on original intent, a
method which largely defined originalism67 until recently68 and which
continues to be used69 although subject to some legitimate attacks in certain
contexts.70 The discussion of legislative history also speaks to original
understanding or original public meaning of Section 4, methods which now
attract a wider following than original intent71 even as originalism still takes
many forms.72 In particular, legislative history illuminates Section 4 to the
extent its meaning is under-determinate by providing evidence of how
particular terms were understood by those who drafted and proposed the
clause and by shedding light on what the language meant to reasonable
persons in the mid-1960s. As such, the resolutions suggested below should
be persuasive to those who emphasize text or originalism of various forms
and to those who are receptive to more pluralistic assortments of
constitutional arguments which consider text and originalism along with
other conventionally practiced methods.

67
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constitutional language.”).
See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L. J. 1, 13 (1971)
(requiring consideration of “framers’ intent”); Edwin Meese, III, The Supreme Court of the United States:
Bulwark of a Limited Constitution, 27 S. TEX. L. REV. 455, 464 (1986) (calling for “jurisprudence of
original intention”).
See, e.g., Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599, 609 (2004)
(“[N]ew originalism is focused less on the concrete intentions of individual drafters . . . than on
the public meaning of the text that was adopted.”)
See, e.g., NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2558 (2014) (citing the Federalist papers as evidence
of the Founders’ intent); Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2263–64
(2013) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (discussing Framers’ intent regarding the Voter Qualification
Clause); McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 768–69 (2010) (plurality opinion) (using
original intent to show that the right to keep and bear arms was regarded as fundamental); id. at
772–77 (using evidence of original intent to show that right to keep and bear arms was viewed as a
fundamental right for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment); District of Columbia v. Heller, 554
U.S. 570, 636–37, 655–62 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (considering the drafting history of the
Second Amendment in interpreting it).
See, e.g., Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204, 212–13
(1980) (discussing the difficulty in imputing an intent to a body whose members may have different
intents); Daniel A. Farber, The Originalism Debate: A Guide for the Perplexed, 49 OHIO ST. L. J. 1085,
1087–89 (1989) (discussing the difficulty of determining the Framers’ intent since records were
incomplete and some issues were not considered); David A. Strauss, Originalism, Conservatism, and
Judicial Restraint, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 137, 138–41 (2011) (identifying as problems for
originalism ascertaining meaning and translating it into distant time periods).
See, e.g., Whittington, supra note 68, at 609–10 (explaining reasons for shifting away from focus on
original intent).
See, e.g., Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 DUKE L.J. 239, 244 (2009)
(describing disputes among originalists); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Are Originalist Constitutional Theories
Principled, or Are They Rationalizations for Conservatism?, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 5, 7 (2011) (“There
are multiple strands of originalism, with additional versions proliferating as rapidly as law reviews
can publish them.”).
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Although some have questioned the value of legislative history especially
regarding statutory interpretation, it continues to be used in constitutional
interpretation.73 At times, the Court explains its failure to offer legislative
history from the drafting or ratification of the original Constitution based on
the absence of evidence,74 thereby suggesting its relevance where available.
The argument for considering legislative history regarding the Twentyfifth Amendment is quite strong. The legislative history is extensive and
preserved.75
Principal architects reasonably understood that their
expressions had weight76 and expressed themselves publicly on important
issues thereby communicating not simply their intent but their understanding
of important terms. Their ultimate conclusions were largely consistent with
each other and generally not contradicted by other participants. The
legislative materials were accessible to ratifiers, as were summations which
were sent to them. The legislative history provides a reliable source of insight
regarding the meaning of Section 4 and other provisions of the Amendment.
A. The Central Role of the Presidential Inability Provisions
The misunderstanding of Section 4 began with misstatements of the
events that produced it. In particular, some comments significantly
understated the importance of the inability provisions to the Amendment or
their applicability to mental illness.
73

74

75

76

See, e.g., Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2113 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (citing the
Federalist papers as evidence of original understanding); id. at 2099 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing
legislative history at ratification debates to show original understanding); McDonald v. City of
Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 768–9 (2010) (using legislative history to show that the Framers regarded the
right to keep and bear arms as fundamental); id. at 825–27 (Thomas, J., concurring) (using legislative
history to show an understanding that privileges and immunities of U.S. citizenship included rights
set forth in the Constitution); Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 886–87 (1991) (relying on legislative
report defining a constitutional term as “instructive” in “confirm[ing]” the term’s meaning).
See e.g., Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2085 (noting the failure to including extensive legislative history
because “the Reception Clause received little attention at the Constitutional Convention.”); Free
Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 517 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(explaining failure to cite legislative history since “[t]he President’s power to remove Executive
Branch officers ‘was not discussed in the Constitutional Convention.’”).
YALE LAW SCHOOL RULE OF LAW CLINIC, supra note 8, at 10 (noting the Twenty-fifth
Amendment’s “unusually robust and accessible drafting and legislative” history and absence of
other interpretive aids).
See, e.g., Presidential Inability and Vacancies in the Office of Vice President: Hearing on S.J. Res. 1 Before the
Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 15 (1965) [hereinafter
1965 Senate Hearings] (statement of Acting Att’y Gen. Nicholas Katzenbach) (advising that terms in
proposed constitutional amendment could be clarified in legislative reports or debates); 111 CONG.
REC. 15,384 (1965) (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh) (stating that constitutional interpretation would
consider “interpretations placed upon the measure by the Senator in charge of the bill.”).
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For instance, Jeff Greenfield wrote that the “core purpose” of the
Amendment “was not aimed at presidential incapacity at all” but was to
remedy the recurring problem of vice-presidential vacancy.77 Greenfield
treated presidential inability as simply “a second issue” to be addressed.78 By
minimizing the centrality of presidential inability to the Amendment,
Greenfield invited readers to infer that the provisions received relatively little
consideration.
The history reads quite differently. Although the assassination of
President John F. Kennedy on November 22, 1963, created a vicepresidential vacancy and provided the immediate impetus for the Twentyfifth Amendment, the roots of the Amendment preceded that tragedy, the
relevant context which produced it was more complicated, and its focus was
much wider than filling the second office. Far from being secondary, the
presidential inability provisions were at the core of the Amendment.
The work towards fashioning a constitutional Amendment to ensure
presidential continuity began in the mid-1950s after President Dwight D.
Eisenhower suffered a heart attack on September 24, 1955. Eisenhower was
hospitalized for about seven weeks, did not meet with his Cabinet until right
before Thanksgiving, and was away from Washington, save for a few days,
for nearly four months.79 The executive branch, under the leadership of
Attorney General Herbert Brownell, began to study presidential inability, as
did Congress. Representative Emanuel Celler, chair of the House
Committee on the Judiciary, prepared a questionnaire which elicited
responses of seventeen scholars regarding how to address presidential
inability.80 A Celler-led House subcommittee held hearings on presidential
inability in 195681 and 1957,82 as did the Senate Subcommittee on
Constitutional Amendments in 1958.83 Eisenhower’s ileitis surgery on June
9, 1956, and his stroke on November 25, 1957, added urgency to the issue.84
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Greenfield, supra note 24.
Id.
JOHN D. FEERICK, FROM FAILING HANDS: THE STORY OF PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION 213–21
(1965).
H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 84th Cong., PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY 1–62 (Comm. Print 1956).
Presidential Inability: Hearings Before the Special Subcomm. to Study Presidential Inability of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 84th Cong. (1956).
Presidential Inability: Hearings Before the Special Subcomm. on Study of Presidential Inability of the H. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 85th Cong. (1957).
Presidential Inability: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments of the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 85th Cong. (1958).
FEERICK, supra note 79, at 223–27.
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When it became clear that institutional constraints, disagreement on the
merits of competing approaches, and partisan considerations85 would
prevent Congress from acting quickly, Eisenhower entered into a letter
agreement with Vice President Richard M. Nixon as a partial solution
regarding presidential inability. It provided that if disabled, Eisenhower
could, if able to do so, voluntarily transfer power temporarily to Nixon as
acting President, that Nixon could effect such a transfer if Eisenhower was
disabled but unable to act to shift presidential power, and that, in either case,
Eisenhower could reclaim presidential powers when he determined the
inability had ended.86 Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson adopted essentially
the same arrangement.87 The Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional
Amendments conducted further hearings on presidential inability in June
196388 and had reported Senate Joint Resolution 35 (“S.J. Res. 35”) to the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary that summer,89 a proposal quite different
from that ultimately adopted, but the death in August of its principal
Democratic sponsor, Senator Estes Kefauver, diminished its prospects.90
The American Bar Association, which played a critical role in formulating
and advocating for the proposed Twenty-fifth Amendment, had endorsed
S.J. Res. 35.91 John D. Feerick, whose scholarship, legislative testimony and
consulting, and ABA work helped produce and explain the Amendment, had
published his first law review article in the area a month before the Kennedy
assassination,92 and the New York Times ran Feerick’s letter on presidential
continuity only a few days before Dallas.93 Feerick’s article and letter dealt
exclusively with presidential inability.

85

86

87
88
89
90
91
92
93

HERBERT BROWNELL & JOHN P. BURKE, ADVISING IKE: THE MEMOIRS OF ATTORNEY
GENERAL HERBERT BROWNELL 278 (1993) (citing misgivings of congressional Democrats to
elevate the status of Nixon).
Agreement Between the President and Vice President as to Procedures in the Event of Presidential
Disability, PUB. PAPERS 196–97 (Mar. 3, 1958). Sarah Vowell’s criticism of Eisenhower’s action as
“neither legal nor, in retrospect, judicious,” see Vowell, supra note 52, is unfair in that Eisenhower
was acting to fill a gap pending legislative action. Subsequent administrations followed the
Eisenhower-Nixon model, and Attorneys Generals Brownell, William Rogers, and Robert F.
Kennedy all certified to its constitutionality.
White House Statement and Text of Agreement Between the President and Vice President on
Procedures in the Event of Presidential Inability, PUB. PAPERS 561 (Aug. 10, 1961).
FEERICK, supra note 10, at 54–55.
Id. at 54.
Id. at 55.
Id. at 54–55.
See, e.g., John D. Feerick, The Problem of Presidential Inability—Will Congress Ever Solve It?, 32 FORDHAM
L. REV. 73 (1963).
John D. Feerick, Letter to the Editor, Fixing Presidential Succession, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 1963, at E8.
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To be sure, filling a vice-presidential vacancy was a central purpose of
the Amendment. Senator Birch Bayh, who succeeded Kefauver as chair of
the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments, regarded vicepresidential vacancy as “[t]he most immediate problem” in December 1963
when he began to focus on the issue.94 After all, the vice presidency was then
vacant, as it had been on fifteen prior occasions for more than thirty-six
years.95 The Presidential Succession Act of 1947 placed the speaker of the
House of Representatives and President Pro Tempore of the Senate next in
line,96 and many thought the current incumbents, John McCormack and
Carl Hayden respectively, too old and not presidential timber, especially in
a nuclear age.97 The common alternative to legislative succession, placing
Cabinet officials, beginning with the Secretary of State, atop the line of
succession, also had drawbacks. Cabinet officials were unelected and often
were area specialists, not the political generalists the presidency required.98
The vice presidency had grown, especially beginning with the tenure of
Richard M. Nixon,99 and many saw filling a vice-presidential vacancy as the
best means to provide for presidential succession.100 Moreover, if the second
office could be filled when vacant, America would be far less likely to ever
need to call on a legislative or Cabinet successor.101
The immediacy of vice-presidential vacancy did not, however, render
presidential inability a peripheral concern. Rather, the presidential inability
provisions were central to the Amendment.102 The disability provisions of
94
95
96
97
98
99

100

101
102

BIRCH BAYH, ONE HEARTBEAT AWAY: PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY AND SUCCESSION 32 (1968).
FEERICK, supra note 79, at 244.
3 U.S.C. § 19(a)–(b) (2006).
Goldstein, supra note 9, at 965.
Cf. id. at 1027 (discussing lack of democratic pedigree of some Cabinet members).
BAYH, supra note 94, at 23 (“President Eisenhower had since 1952 relied so heavily on Richard
Nixon that the office of Vice President had soared to unprecedented importance.”); JOEL K.
GOLDSTEIN, THE MODERN AMERICAN VICE PRESIDENCY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF A
POLITICAL INSTITUTION 137 (1982). See generally Roy E. Brownell, II, A Constitutional Chameleon: The
Vice President’s Place Within the American System of Separation of Powers Part II: Political Branch Interpretation
and Counterarguments, 24 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 294, 342–48 (2015) (detailing the evolution of the
vice presidency during Nixon’s tenure in it).
See, e.g., John D. Feerick, The Vice-Presidency and the Problem of Presidential Succession and Inability, 32
FORDHAM L. REV. 457, 489–90 (1964) (explaining that filling a vice-presidential vacancy would
best provide for a qualified presidential successor).
See Joel K. Goldstein, Akhil Reed Amar and Presidential Continuity, 47 HOUS. L. REV. 67, 71 (2010)
(emphasizing that Section 2 minimizes the time in which the vice presidency is vacant).
See, e.g., BAYH, supra note 94, at 32 (“It was important, too, to deal with the problem of Presidential
disability . . . .”); id. at 47 (“The first part of the general problem, and the one that had been most
thoroughly discussed, was the area of Presidential disability. . . . Then I turned to the other
problem: how to fill vacancies in the office of Vice President.”); id. at 117 (criticizing a proposal that
did not address vice-presidential vacancy and presidential inability).
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what became the Twenty-fifth Amendment had been in the works for nearly
a decade.103 Sections 1, 3, and 4 of the Amendment, none of which addressed
vice-presidential vacancy, were modified versions of proposals advanced by
the Eisenhower Administration and by a bipartisan group of legislators during
the 1950s.104 Even Section 2, the one part of the Amendment that addressed
vice-presidential vacancy, was related to the presidential inability provisions
which required a Vice President to be operative.105
Presidential inability was an integral, not incidental, target of the
Amendment which addressed presidential succession, vice-presidential
vacancy, and presidential inability. These three topics reflected a larger
preoccupation with ensuring continuity of presidential leadership106 during
the Cold War and especially in a nuclear age.107 Bayh stated the basic
purpose of the reform effort in 1964, declaring that “the safety of the United
States demands a President who is always capable of making rational
decisions and rational determinations; and in the event the President is
unable to make these determinations it demands that the Vice President be
able to assume the powers and duties of the President, so that this country
may always be in the hands of one who is able to make the necessary

103
104

105
106

107

See FEERICK, supra note 10, at 50–53 (discussing reform efforts during the 1950s regarding
presidential inability).
See Joel K. Goldstein, The Bipartisan Bayh Amendment: Republican Contributions to the Twenty-fifth
Amendment, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 1137, 1142–44, 1146 (2017) (outlining various legislative remedies
introduced over the course of the 1950s which helped shape the Twenty-fifth Amendment).
See, e.g., Goldstein, supra note 4, at 536–40 (describing connections between Vice President and
presidential inability provisions).
BAYH, supra note 94, at 8 (1968) (“During the first week of December, newspapers reflected the
national concern over the problems related to executive continuity. . . . The problem was
threefold.”); Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union, 1 PUB. PAPERS 1, 8 (Jan.
4, 1965) (“I will propose laws to insure the necessary continuity of leadership should the President
become disabled or die.”); Presidential Inability and Vacancies in the Office of Vice President: Hearings on S.J.
Res. 13 et al. Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong.
40–41 [hereinafter 1964 Senate Hearings] (statement of Professor James C. Kirby, Jr.) (describing
presidential inability as part of and interrelated to the problem of presidential succession); 110
CONG. REC. 22,983 (1964) (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh) (describing the issue as involving “the
basic structure and the basic transfer of authority of executive power, the office of the President and
the office of the Vice President of the United States of America.”).
110 CONG. REC. 22,990 (1964) (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh) (“However, in this day of nuclear
power . . . the safety of the United States demands a President who is always capable . . . .”);
Goldstein, supra note 9, at 964 (“[T]he advent of the nuclear age and of the Cold War . . . lent
urgency to the subject of presidential succession and inability.”); see also AKHIL REED AMAR,
AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 448 (2005) (“In a nuclear world where each side in the
Cold War had the capability of striking the other in a manner of minutes, could America afford to
be effectively leaderless for even a short interval? Could the nation risk the mere possibility of a
shaky finger on the button?”).
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decisions at the necessary time.”108 Bayh and others wanted to address other
gaps that threatened presidential continuity, including vice-presidential
inability and the line of succession after the Vice President.109 Ultimately,
Bayh and others concluded that a holistic approach would be
counterproductive.110 The more comprehensive the proposal, the more
ambitious its targets, the less likely it was to succeed. Instead Bayh and others
decided to address the two most pressing problems—vice-presidential
vacancies and presidential inability—and defer other issues to the future.
The report accompanying Senate Joint Resolution 1 (“S.J. Res. 1”)—in
identifying the dual and related purposes of the proposal—recited:
The purpose of the proposed Senate Joint Resolution 1, as amended, is
to provide for continuity in the office of the Chief Executive [in the event
that the President becomes unable to exercise the powers and duties of the
office] and further, to provide for the filling of vacancies in the office of the
Vice President whenever such vacancies may occur.111

The legislative discussions relating to Congress’s action in proposing the
Amendment consistently emphasized the related nature of the problems and
the centrality of presidential inability. Bayh described his initial proposal,
Senate Joint Resolution 139 (“S.J. Res. 139”) as “an attempt to deal at one
time with the closely related questions of Presidential succession and
Presidential inability.”112 He said that “[e]very reason and logic and sound
organization calls upon us to deal simultaneously”113 with the contingencies
which might present a challenge to presidential continuity. When the ABA
convened a blue-ribbon working group to consider the issue in January 1964,
its consensus statement, which both reflected S.J. Res. 139 and informed its
further development, devoted most space to presidential inability.114 During
hearings and floor debate, legislators and witnesses emphasized the dual

108
109
110

111
112
113
114

110 CONG. REC. 22,990 (1964) (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh).
See FEERICK, supra note 10, at 71–75 (discussing other issues ABA and the original version of S.J.
Res. 139 addressed which were eliminated to maximize support).
See BAYH, supra note 94, at 48 (describing decision to drop provision creating Cabinet line of
succession after Vice President); Presidential Inability: Hearings on H.R. 836 et al. Before the H. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 57, 77–78 (1965) [hereinafter 1965 House Hearings] (statement of Sen. Birch
Bayh) (explaining decision not to address simultaneous presidential and vice-presidential inability
in proposed amendment); 111 CONG. REC. 3253 (1965) (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh) (explaining
decision not to provide for vice-presidential inability); 110 CONG. REC. 22,991–92 (1964) (statement
of Sen. Samuel Ervin) (describing considerations which led to minimizing issues covered in
proposed amendment).
S. REP. NO. 89-66, at 4 (1965)
109 CONG. REC. 24,420 (1963).
Id.
Constitutional Amendment Urged on Presidential Inability and Succession, 50 A.B.A. J. 237, 238 (1964).
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purpose of the proposals,115 noted the interrelationship of the issues,116 referred
to presidential inability as having greater117 or at least equal importance,118 or
described presidential inability as the more difficult problem119 or emphasized
the importance of addressing presidential inability.120

115

116

117

118

119

120

110 CONG. REC. 22,983 (1964) (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh) (describing “[t]he problems of vicepresidential vacancies and Presidential inability” as “complex and significant.”); see also 1964 Senate
Hearings, supra note 106, at 1, 3 (statements of Sen. Birch Bayh) (discussing both issues).
1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 106, at 67 (statement of Sen. Edward V. Long) (stating that the
problems of succession and inability “are so intertwined as to be inseparable.”); id. at 115 (statement
of Professor James McGregor Burns) (referring to “the twin problems of Presidential inability and
vice presidential vacancy.”); id. at 128 (statement of Professor Paul A. Freund) (stating that
Presidential inability and succession were “two distinct problems, but they are interrelated.”); id. at
134 (statement of former Att’y Gen. Herbert Brownell) (referring to “[p]residential disability and
the related question of presidential succession”).
1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 106, at 25–26 (statement of Sen. Kenneth Keating) (stating that “it
is many times more imperative to act in the field of inability than in the distinct area of Presidential
succession” since Congress had provided for a line of succession but had not addressed inability);
id. at 150 (statement of John D. Feerick) (describing presidential inability as “the most important
problem” facing Bayh’s subcommittee and Congress); id. at 156 (favoring dropping the provision
changing the line of succession after Vice President, owing to importance of addressing presidential
inability).
1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 106, at 93 (statement of Lewis F. Powell, Jr., President-elect of the
American Bar Association) (describing the issues as of “equal importance”); Richard M. Nixon, We
Need a Vice President Now, SATURDAY EVENING POST, Jan. 1, 1964, at 6, 10 (referring to “the equally
important question of presidential disability.”); see also 1965 Senate Hearings, supra note 76, at 11
(statement of Acting Att’y Gen. Nicholas Katzenbach) (describing vice presidential vacancy as an
“equally critical problem” as presidential inability).
1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 106, at 17 (statement of Sen. Samuel Ervin) (describing presidential
inability as “a thornier problem”); id. at 82 (statement of Sen. Frank Church) (referring to the
“vexatious problem of disability” which “is a more difficult problem to resolve than any other”); id.
at 232 (letter from former President Dwight D. Eisenhower) (stating that handling presidential
inability was “more complicated” than presidential succession or vice-presidential vacancy); 110
CONG. REC. 22,989 (1964) (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh) (referring to “the equally, if not more
vexing problem of disability which may occur in the office of the Presidency.”); id. at 23,001
(statement of Sen. James B. Pearson) (“The disability of a living President poses a problem as
difficult as that of succession.”).
110 CONG. REC. 22,987 (1964) (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh) (stating that “[o]ur obligation to deal
also with the question of presidential inability is crystal clear” to remedy a “constitutional gap, or a
blind spot. We must fill this gap if we are to protect our Nation from the possibility of floundering
in the sea of public confusion and uncertainty.”); id. at 22,992 (statement of Sen. Leverett Saltonstall)
(stating that provisions regarding presidential disability needed to be clarified because “so much
depends upon the continued and uninterrupted functioning of our Government”); id. at 22,994
(statement of Sen. Alan Bible) (stating that “[t]he Government cannot afford the luxury of Executive
inactivity because of illness or other inability in the Presidency”); id. at 22,997 (statement of Sen.
Mike Monroney) (stating that the disability provisions were “vitally necessary, more so each day”);
see also Feerick, supra note 100, at 498 (“The problems of the succession and inability are now before
Congress for action. Ideally, both should be solved, together if possible. However, if anything is
going to be solved, the problem of inability should be. It has first claim for action. It has been left
unsolved for almost two centuries.”); 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 106, at 88 (report from the
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The pertinent legislative reports in the Senate stated that “the purpose”
of the proposed constitutional amendment “is to provide for continuity in the
office of the Chief Executive [in the event that the President becomes unable
to exercise the powers and duties of the office] and further, to provide for the
filling of vacancies in the office of the Vice President whenever such
vacancies may occur.”121 The reports accompanying the proposals in the
Senate and House spent far more space on presidential inability than on vicepresidential vacancy.122 In the mid-1960s, some raised the specter that had
Kennedy been incapacitated rather than killed, the constitutional system
would have been ill-equipped to respond.123 The frequency of that argument
made evident the preoccupation with presidential inability. It surfaced even
when addressing the traumatic, recent presidential assassination.
Far from being a secondary purpose, the presidential inability provisions
were an integral part of the Twenty-fifth Amendment. In fact, the House
was far more enthusiastic about addressing presidential inability than filling
a vice-presidential vacancy which some members saw as an insult to the

121
122
123

American Bar Association) (describing its “first and perhaps . . . most important” proposal as
making clear that during a presidential inability, presidential powers and duties, but not the
presidency, passed to the Vice President); id. at 235 (statement of former Vice President Nixon)
(calling presidential inability “the major problem, and the problem that needs most urgent
attention”).
S. REP. NO. 89-66, at 4 (1965); see also S. REP. NO. 88-1382, at 2 (1964) (providing a similar
purpose).
See S. REP. NO. 88-1382 (1964); S. REP. NO. 89-66 (1965); H.R. REP. NO. 89-203 (1965).
1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 106, at 22 (statement of Sen. Kenneth Keating) (observing that “a
matter of inches” could have converted Kennedy’s “painless death” into a “permanent incapacity”);
id. at 61 (statement of Sen. Frank Moss) (speaking of a bullet “which wounds but does not kill”); id.
at 67 (statement of Sen. Edward V. Long) (referring to the possibility that Kennedy were left alive
but disabled); id. at 150 (statement of John D. Feerick) (“Had our late President lived, hovering
unconsciously between life and death, there would have been no one clearly authorized either to
say that the President was unable to make a major decision if one had to be made. The
circumstances surrounding the death of President Kennedy should have taught us that we can no
longer afford the uncertainty that presently exists regarding the critical problem of Presidential
inability.”); id. at 101 (statement of Lewis F. Powell, Jr., President-elect of the American Bar
Association) (“Had the President been disabled so that he could not continue to discharge his
immense responsibilities, a series of questions would have arisen.”); Herbert Brownell, former Att’y
Gen., The History of the Problem, Remarks at the National Forum on Presidential Inability and
Vice Presidential Vacancy (May 25, 1964), in AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, PRESIDENTIAL
INABILITY AND VICE PRESIDENTIAL VACANCY (1964), at 2–5 (raising specter of Kennedy lingering
disabled for weeks or months after shooting); FEERICK, supra note 79, at 20 (observing that “[o]ne
wonders what would have happened if on November 22, 1963, President John F. Kennedy had not
died—but had lingered on, unconscious for days or even weeks.”); James Reston, Why America
Weeps, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 1963, at 1, 7 (“[I]t was not clear again what would have happened if
the young President, instead of being mortally wounded, had lingered for a long time between life
and death, strong enough to survive but too weak to govern.”).
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speaker.124 Both bodies spent extensive time on the presidential inability
provisions, especially Section 4. Indeed, when Bayh’s subcommittee
reexamined the operation of the vice-presidential vacancy provision in 1975,
Bayh and witness, Antonin Scalia, then the Assistant Attorney General for
the Office of Legal Counsel, agreed that a decade earlier more attention had
been given to presidential inability than to succession.125 The legislative
record confirms their conclusion. And most of the time on presidential
inability related to Section 4.
B. Section 4 and Mental Incapacity
Some recent commentators have either questioned whether Section 4
applied to mental incapacity or suggested that its architects were primarily
concerned with physical disability. For instance, the distinguished historian,
Julian Zelizer, wrote that “the drafters [of the Twenty-fifth Amendment] had
physical disability in mind” not mental competency.126 Professor Zelizer
complained of “considerable ambiguity in the language of the Amendment
to challenge the circumstances under which it can be used (meaning to
address the psychological rather than physical condition of a president),”127
a statement that appears to reinforce Professor Zelizer’s question regarding
the extent to which the Amendment addressed mental incapacity. Ian Tuttle
observed that “the [A]mendment arose as a response to specific, concrete
episodes of physical incapacitation.”128 Professor Turley was quoted as
saying that the Amendment was added “largely for physical incapacity” but
because its language was “ambiguous” it left room for arguments that it
covered mental incapacity, too.129 Professor Julia Azari acknowledged that
mental inability was included, but wrote that “[t]he context” of the
Amendment “was pretty clearly aimed at the kind of physical and mental

124

125

126
127
128
129

John D. Feerick, The Proposed Twenty-fifth Amendment to the Constitution, 34 FORDHAM L. REV. 173, 186
n.55 (1965) (describing resentment among House members at the widespread questioning of its
Speaker’s ability to act as President).
Examination of the First Implementation of Section Two of the Twenty-fifth Amendment, Hearings on S.J. Res. 26
Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 53–54 (1975)
[hereinafter Examination]; see also id. at 55 (statement of Sen. Hiram Fong) (“[T]he thrust of that
amendment really was on disability. We were looking to see how the President could regain his
power once he was disabled, that was the thrust of that amendment.”).
Zelizer, supra note 43.
Id.
Tuttle, supra note 34.
Deena Zaru, Constitutional Scholars: 25th Amendment Talk ‘Premature,’ Unrealistic, CNN POLITICS (July
4, 2017, 12:34 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/07/03/politics/what-is-the-25th-amendmentdonald-trump/index.html.
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incapacities that come after strokes, heart attacks and bullets.”130
Far from being an afterthought or a fortuitous beneficiary of allegedly
ambiguous language, addressing a mentally incapacitated president was a
prime objective. The Amendment’s very text suggests its wider coverage.
Section 4 speaks of the President being “unable to discharge the powers and
duties” of the presidency, language clearly broad enough to cover mental as
well as physical incapacity. Had the framers intended a narrower focus, they
could easily have made “physically unable” the trigger.
The legislative history confirms that mental incapacity was a primary
concern of the Amendment. Its architects thought that most uses would
involve planned operations or injuries or illnesses,131 but they consciously
included mental inability as a principal target of Section 4.132 They
recognized that the most challenging contingencies would involve mental
incapacity and they spent a great deal of time discussing it. And the language
they used made clear that they intended to include mental illness which
occurred independent of an assassination attempt or acute medical episode.
President Johnson’s 1965 message to Congress in which he endorsed S.J.
Res. 1 and its House counterpart, House Joint Resolution 1 (“H.R.J. Res. 1”)
made their application to mental illness, including degenerative processes,
explicit when he called for their adoption to protect against “a President’s
incapacity by injury, illness, senility or other affliction.”133 The legislative
reports accompanying the proposals specified that Section 4 addressed
inabilities relating to “the President’s physical and mental condition.”134
130

131

132

133
134

Julia Azari, What Does Invoking the 25th Amendment Actually Look Like?, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Apr. 19,
2018, 6:00 AM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/what-does-invoking-the-25th-amendmentactually-look-like/.
1965 House Hearings, supra note 110, at 92 (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh) (predicting that ninety
percent of disability problems would either be handled under Section 3 or would involve clear
instances where the president had suffered a serious illness, like a heart attack that placed him in
intensive care at a time “the Russians move missiles into Cuba.”); id. at 240 (statement of former
Att’y Gen. Herbert Brownell) (predicting that Section 3 would cover most situations of presidential
inability and that Section 4 would cover “the rare but dangerous situations where the President is
unable to declare his inability. Typical of these would be a situation where the President was
unconscious, or where he was mentally ill.”).
See, e.g., FEERICK, supra note 10, at 112 (stating that legislative discussions “most frequently
mentioned cases” and “[s]ituations involving physical or mental illness” as rendering a President
“unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office” or as constituting “inability”).
Special Message to the Congress on Presidential Disability and Related Matters, 1 PUB. PAPERS 101–02 (Jan.
28, 1965) (emphasis added); see also 1965 House Hearings, supra note 110, at 7.
S. REP. NO. 89-66, at 13 (1965) (stating assumption that Section 4 decision by Vice President and
Cabinet would follow “adequate consultation with medical experts who were intricately familiar
with the President’s physical and mental condition.”); H.R. REP. NO. 89-203, at 13 (1965) (same);
S. REP. NO. 88-1382, at 12 (1964) (same).
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During Senate hearings, various witnesses spoke of inability as including
mental or physical incapacity.135 President Eisenhower, for instance, wrote
that “[a] disability could be of different kinds, one caused by physical or
mental illness, or another by an absence from the seat of government of such
a character that would preclude Presidential decisions and actions in time of
emergency.”136 He thought the only situation to be feared would involve a
President who was “so mentally deranged.”137 Bayh said his proposal was
intended to “deal with any type of inability.”138 Senator Roman Hruska
repeatedly used formulations that communicated that the Amendment
covered mental disability.139
When Bayh testified before the House Judiciary Committee in February
1965, he repeatedly mentioned mental inability. He agreed that the problem
was how to address a situation where the President became physically or
mentally incompetent to handle the presidency.140 He acknowledged that
“[t]he problem of mental disability . . . is a tough one” since “the facts are
difficult to nail down” and thought the provisions relating to intra-executive
branch disputes “would be implemented” in such a situation.141 If the
President were “mentally incompetent” it would be incumbent on the Vice
President and Cabinet to act under Section 4.142
When the Senate debated S.J. Res. 1, several senators who played
instrumental roles in constructing the Amendment made clear that it applied
to mental incapacities. Bayh referred to a situation involving a “deranged”
President.143 Senator Ervin observed that Congress might have to decide a

135

136
137
138
139

140
141
142
143

See, e.g., 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 106, at 45 (statement of Professor James C. Kirby, Jr.) (stating
that conflict between President and Vice President/Cabinet would “undoubtedly” involve “mental
illness”); id. at 60 (statement of Sen. Frank Moss) (speaking of a need to have a President “who is
physically and mentally able to conduct the duties of his office”); id. at 61 (speaking of President
losing powers “through the unrelenting march of age”).
1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 106, at 232.
Id.
1965 Senate Hearings, supra note 76, at 20.
Id. at 22 (stating psychiatric examinations following involuntary removal might take longer than
physical examinations); id. at 24 (referring to “insufficient mental or physical powers to continue in
office”); id. at 25 (referring to “physical or mental capabilities”); id. at 33 (“The issue is simply
whether a specific individual with certain physical, mental, or emotional impairments possesses the
ability to continue as the Chief Executive or whether his infirmity is so serious and severe as to
render him incapable of executing the duties of his office.”); id. at 34 (referring to “physical or
mental faculties”).
1965 House Hearings, supra note 110, at 54.
Id.
Id.
111 CONG. REC. 3257 (1965).
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challenge involving alleged “mental disability” of the President144 and
thought a challenge regarding “mental disability” might require
investigation145 and testimony.146 Senator Hruska foresaw questions relating
to the “mental ability” or sanity of the President that would require
psychiatric investigation whereby “psychiatrists” would need to report to
Congress their observations and tests of the President.147
The legislative record in the House of Representatives also made clear
that Section 4 applied to mental inability. Numerous members of Congress
referred to mental incapacity as part of the problem the proposals addressed
during the 1965 House hearings, and the comments included many that
explicitly referenced, or were broad enough to encompass, mental inabilities
independent of attacks or physical illnesses.148
When the House debated the measure, Representative Richard Poff, an
important architect of the Amendment, identified the cases falling within
Section 4 as those “in which the President by reason of physical or mental
debility, is unable to perform his duties but is unable or unwilling to make a
rational decision to relinquish the powers of his office, even for a temporary
period.”149 Poff described these cases as including situations where the
President was unconscious or otherwise unable to make or communicate a
decision to relinquish presidential powers or when “the President, by reason
of mental debility, is unable or unwilling to make any rational decision,
144
145
146
147
148

149

Id. at 3278; see also id. at 3279 (statement of Sen. Samuel Ervin) (referring to President’s “physical
state or mental state”).
Id. at 3278 (noting that “evidence would have to be adduced”).
Id. at 3279.
Id. at 3278.
1965 House Hearings, supra note 110, at 53 (statement of Rep. Byron G. Rogers) (referring to Wilson
incapacity as involving lack of “mental capacity”); id. at 54 (statement of Rep. Harold D. Donahue)
(referring to “mentally incompetent” President); id. (stating that the “whole problem” under
discussion was what should be done “when the President shall become physically or mentally
incompetent to carry out the duties of the office”); id. at 57 (statement of Rep. Peter W. Rodino, Jr.)
(referring to “mental competency”); id. at 58 (statement of Rep. Byron G. Rogers) (imagining
commission with five psychiatrists); id. at 62 (imagining situation with “insane” President); id. at 141
(statement of Rep. Willard S. Curtin) (speaking of a President who was “insane”); id. at 142 (speaking
of a President who became “mentally incapacitated for a week”); id. at 144 (speaking of President’s
“mental condition”); id. at 147 (statement of Rep. Basil L. Whitener) (speaking of President being
accused of “being mentally incompetent”); id. at 148 (statement of Rep. Willard S. Curtin) (speaking
of mental illness); id. at 181 (statement of Rep. William S. Moorhead) (speaking of a President who
had a “stroke, a coma, or mental disability”); id. at 252 (statement of Rep. John V. Lindsay) (speaking
of President “in an acute state of depression over world affairs”); id. at 252 (speaking of President’s
“mental capacity”); id. at 254–55 (statement of Rep. Charles McC. Mathias, Jr.) (speaking of
possibility that same sort of “[mental] debility” that afflicted Secretary of Defense James Forrestal
could affect a President); id. at 276 (statement of Rep. Jeffery Cohelan) (referring to senility).
111 CONG. REC. 7941 (1965).
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including particularly the decision to stand aside.”150
Other members of the House understood that Section 4 would apply to
mental as well as physical inability. Representative Durward Hall, himself a
physician, argued for the relevance of medical expertise and questioned
whether Cabinet members were equipped to “determine when association
pathways of the human brain and mind, or even the emotions, were bereft
of ordinary and expected continuity on the part of the President to the point
of constituting disability.”151 Representative Robert McClory specifically
referenced “any mental or physical incapacity”152 and situations where the
President is “physically or mentally disabled.”153 Representative James
Corman said “one of the things we are concerned about is mental incapacity
of a President.”154 Celler observed that “[t]he President may be as nutty as
a fruitcake. He may be utterly insane.”155 Corman, after observing that
mental incapacity was a primary target of the Amendment, warned that
“when a man is mentally incapable, he is the last one to realize it.”156
The Senate debate on the Conference Report included numerous
statements suggesting that mental illness was a primary target of Section 4.
Bayh said that a President “might be physically able” but “might not possess
the mental capacity to make a decision and perform the powers and duties of
his office.”157 When Senator Robert F. Kennedy said inability “involves
physical or mental inability to make or communicate his decision regarding his
capacity and physical or mental inability to exercise the powers and duties of
his office,” Bayh agreed.158 Senator Ervin imagined a President suffering from
“a mental disease,” yet the loyal Cabinet unwilling to declare him disabled.159
Senator Albert Gore, Sr. observed that “[d]isability may be psychiatric. It may
be mental. It may be a sort on which people would honestly have differing
opinions. A President might be physically fit—the picture of health; but to
150
151
152
153

154
155
156
157
158
159

Id.
Id. at 7939.
Id. at 7946–47; see also id. at 7953 (statement of Rep. Jacob H. Gilbert) (referring to “President’s
incapacity by injury, illness, or other affliction”).
Id. at 7947; see also id. at 7956 (statement of Rep. William J. Randall) (referring to “physical or mental
incapacity”); id. (“The further idea that a President might actually be forced to step down
involuntarily from office because of physical or mental incapacity is fraught with unpleasant
associations.”); id. at 7964 (statement of Rep. Chester E. Holifield) (hypothesizing a President
suffering a “nervous breakdown” and referring to his “mental condition”).
Id. at 7965.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 15,381.
Id.
Id. at 15,590.
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those who work closely with him, there might be a conviction that he had lost
his mental balance, that he had psychiatric problems.”160 Bayh recognized
that Section 4 could be used if the President “although physically able, is not
the man, from a substantive point, who was previously elected to that office.
Thus arises the difficult problem of mental disability.”161
The architects of the Amendment thought the rare disputes between the
President and Vice President/Cabinet would usually involve questions
regarding the President’s mental fitness. Bayh stated that Section 4 disputed
situations would “usually” involve serious doubt about the President’s
“mental capacity.”162 In preparing for the conference committee, Bayh told
his staff that the Section 4 provisions regarding a conflict between the
President and the Vice President/Cabinet would come into play only “if the
President was as nutty as a fruit cake. Mental illness, pure and simple, is the
only time this provision would be used.”163 Not only did Section 4 apply to
disabilities involving mental illness; these were the occasions when its
challenge mechanisms were expected to be used.
Mental incapacity was clearly a primary, not incidental, target of
Section 4. The text of Section 4 is broad enough to include it and the
legislative record demonstrates that mental disability was a deliberate target.
The Amendment’s architects and numerous others frequently referenced
mental incapacity in contexts which indicated their concern with mental
conditions, including those which were degenerative or otherwise
independent of acute events, thereby confirming that their intent and
understanding coincided with the inclusive meaning of the language of
Section 4. Bayh and Feerick have subsequently confirmed the deliberate
inclusion of mental incapacity.164 Even if a mentally incapacitated president
would be a rare occurrence, legislators regarded it as a particularly vexing
problem and one which needed to be addressed. They discussed it
extensively and provided for it.

160
161
162
163

164

Id. at 15,592.
Id. at 15,593; see also id. at 15,594 (statement of Sen. Russell B. Long) (recognizing Section 4’s
application to mental incapacity).
Id. at 3285 (1965).
BAYH, supra note 94, at 283; see also id. at 285 (referring to President who was “completely off his
rocker” reassuming power); 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 106, at 45 (statement of Professor James
C. Kirby, Jr.) (stating that President who insisted on his ability against contrary views of the Vice
President and Cabinet would “undoubtedly” involve “mental illness.”).
See, e.g., FEERICK, supra note 10, at 115; Examination, supra note 125, at 17 (statement of Sen. Birch
Bayh) (stating that he introduced the Twenty-fifth Amendment in part to address “the potential
problem of the temporary physical or mental incapacity of a President.”).
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C. The Scope of Section 4
Recent discussion has raised questions about the scope of Section 4 in
addition to its application to mental inability. Some commentators have
complained that the presidential inability provisions of Section 4 are
ambiguous in their coverage.165 This conclusion has led writers to reach
quite disparate views regarding its reach.
Some have suggested that Section 4 applies only when a President is
unable to declare his inability, not when he is unwilling to recognize his
inability to discharge the powers and duties of his office. For instance, Scott
Bomboy has written that Section 4 was “designed to deal with a situation
where an incapacitated President couldn’t tell Congress that the Vice
President needed to act as President.”166
Some have accepted this basic premise and applied it to constrict the use
of Section 4. For instance, Professor Jonathan Zimmerman has asserted that
the authors of the Amendment intended Section 4 to apply only if the President
was “absolutely and unambiguously incapable—like John F. Kennedy was, in
the hours between when he was shot and when he died.”167 Jeff Greenfield
argued that Section 4 would only be used for a President who was “unable to
communicate, or curled up in a fugue state.”168 Jeffrey Rosen wrote that

165

166

167
168

See, e.g., Jessica Levinson, Opinion, Will the 25th Amendment Save America from Trump? Not as Written,
NBC (Oct. 31, 2017, 4:10 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/will-25thamendment-save-america-trump-not-written-ncna815851 (“It is vague and broad.”); Zaru, supra
note 129 (quoting Jonathan Turley as referring to the “dangerous ambiguity” of the Amendment);
Joshua Zeitz, Why the 25th Amendment Doesn’t Apply to Trump—No Matter What He Tweets, POLITICO
(Jan. 10, 2018), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/01/10/25th-amendmenttrump-216267 (identifying several points on which Section 4 “is ambiguous”); Zelizer, supra note
43 (referring to “considerable ambiguity in the language”).
Scott Bomboy, Can the Cabinet “Remove” a President Using the 25th Amendment?, CONST. CTR.: CONST.
DAILY (Oct. 12, 2017), https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/can-the-cabinet-remove-a-presidentusing-the-25th-amendment; see Scott Bomboy, Breaking Down the 25th Amendment: What You Need to
Know, CONST. CTR.: CONST. DAILY (May 19, 2017), https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/breakingdown-the-25th-amendment-what-you-need-to-know (“In theory, this clause was designed to deal
with a situation where an incapacitated President couldn’t tell Congress that the Vice President
needed to act as President.”); see also Adam R.F. Gustafson, Presidential Inability and Subjective Meaning,
27 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 459, 462 (2009) (arguing Section 4 applies only when President is “unable
to make or communicate a rational decision to step down temporarily of his own accord.”); Brian C.
Kalt, Letter to the Editor: The Twenty-fifth Amendment Reader’s Guide, JUST SECURITY (May 18, 2018),
https://www.justsecurity.org/56280/letter-editor-twenty-fifth-amendment-readers-guide/ (“The
bottom line is that while Section 4 can apply to all sorts of situations, it is only designed to work well
when the president is unconscious or otherwise unable to communicate.”).
Jonathan Zimmerman, What Liberals Can Learn from Conservatism, NEW REPUBLIC (Dec. 11, 2017),
https://newrepublic.com/article/146192/liberals-can-learn-conservatism.
Greenfield, supra note 24.

Oct. 2018

TALKING TRUMP AND THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT

105

Section 4 applied to “presidents who were clearly and unequivocally
incapacitated to the point of being unable to discharge their duties—in other
words, terminally ill, in a coma, near death, or severely mentally
incapacitated.”169 Conversely, as previously noted, others like Greene, Posner,
Dallek, and Graber argue for a broader understanding of Section 4 that would
encompass certain character flaws or even incompetence.
Finally, some writers have suggested that Section 4 does not apply to a
condition that pre-existed the most recent presidential election, at least if the
electorate knew of it. Historian Joshua Zeitz, for instance, argued that the
Amendment’s framers did not “expressly foresee” that Americans would
elect as president “someone already unfit to serve” and suggested that the
Amendment did not or should not provide a “reprieve from our own
folly.”170 Zelizer characterized using Section 4 regarding Trump as “a
dramatic action overturning the election based on criteria that would be
difficult to determine with any kind of certainty.”171
The decision not to define “unable” or “inability” in the Constitution was
intentional, not inadvertent,172 and the lack of a definition is not proper
ground for criticizing the Amendment or its framers. Representative Poff, a
key actor in the House and conference deliberations,173 explained during
House debate that the ABA and the House Judiciary Committee had
“struggled with the question of defining the word ‘inability’” but “decided
that it would be unwise to attempt such a definition within the framework of
the Constitution.174 To do so would give the definition adopted a rigidity
which, in application, might sometimes be unrealistic.”175 Similarly, Feerick
explained the decision not to define those terms “reflected a judgment that a
rigid constitutional definition was undesirable, since cases of inability could
take various forms not neatly fitting into such a definition.”176 Feerick wrote
that the terms “are intended to cover all cases in which some condition or
circumstance prevents the President from discharging his powers and duties

169
170
171
172

173
174
175
176

Rosen, supra note 37.
Zeitz, supra note 165.
Zelizer, supra note 43.
See FEERICK, supra note 10, at 112 (stating that failure to define terms was not “the result of an
oversight.”); Second Fordham University School of Law Clinic on Presidential Succession, supra
note 7, at 928 (“The Twenty-Fifth Amendment’s framers purposely avoided a specific definition of
inability.”).
Goldstein, supra note 104, at 1162–67 (discussing Poff’s role in the development of the Amendment).
111 CONG. REC. 7941 (1965) (statement of Rep. Richard H. Poff).
Id.
FEERICK, supra note 10, at 112.
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and the public business requires that the Vice President discharge them.”177
The framers understood that they could not anticipate every contingency
the future might present nor could they fashion a more workable definition
than the standard in the Amendment. They sought to leave future decisionmakers flexibility to handle situations that might not have been apparent in
the mid-1960s. In a Constitution that protects “liberty” and “due process,”
prohibits “cruel and unusual punishments” and “unreasonable searches and
seizures,” vests “executive power,” and allows impeachment and removal
from office for “other high Crimes and Misdemeanors,” the words Section 4
deploys are not uncommon. They are more appropriately described as
“flexible” than disparaged as “ambiguous” or “vague.” The standard used
reflected prudence and humility and was not ill-considered.
The text of Section 4 and its legislative history rebut efforts to limit it to
situations where the President is unable to determine or communicate his
inability. Section 4 makes clear that it extends to a President who is
unwilling, as well as to one who is unable, to recognize his inability since it
applies “Whenever” the Vice President and other decision-makers make the
prescribed transmission that the President is “unable to discharge the powers
and duties of his office.”178 The broad language of the text makes the criteria
turn on the President’s inability to perform his powers and duties, not
whether the chief executive recognizes that condition. Far from limiting
Section 4 to situations in which the President is unable to communicate or
lacked the opportunity to act, the text adopts a more capacious formulation
that invites much broader use.
The legislative record confirms that conclusion. The congressional
reports which accompanied the relevant Senate and House measures made
clear that Section 4 applied when the President could, but did not, declare
his inability, not simply when circumstances denied him that option. They
provided that under Section 4, “if a President does not declare that an
inability exists, the Vice President, if satisfied that the President is disabled
shall, with the written approval of a majority of the heads of the executive
departments, assume the discharge of the powers and duties of the Office as

177

178

Id. at 112; see also Feerick, supra note 124, at 197–98 n. 135 (noting that the term “inability” was
intended to cover a wide range of events); John D. Feerick, The Twenty-fifth Amendment: An Explanation
and Defense, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 481, 502 (1995) (“[O]ne would be mistaken to attempt to
define with specificity what constitutes an ‘inability.’ No set of definitions could possibly deal with
every contingency, and the use of detailed language could create a situation where, during a time
of national trauma, unnecessary debate occurs over whether or not the particular facts fit the
definitions, or vice versa.”).
U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4.
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Acting President upon the transmission of such declaration to the
Congress.”179 In other words, Section 4 could be appropriate if a disabled
President did not use Section 3, not simply when he was unable to do so.180
In introducing S.J. Res. 139, Bayh described Section 4 as applying to “the
situation where the President is either unwilling or unable” to declare his own
inability,181 a formulation others adopted during proceedings in the Senate182
and the House.183
The legislative reports presented the undeclared disabilities of Presidents
James Garfield, Woodrow Wilson, and Dwight Eisenhower as instructive
instances in which presidential power should have been, but was not,
transferred to the Vice President,184 and legislators invoked those episodes in
their own statements.185 In some of those situations, the President was able,
179
180

181
182

183

184

185

S. REP. NO. 89-66, at 13 (1965); S. REP. NO. 88-1382, at 11 (1964).
See Operation of the Twenty-fifth Amendment Respecting Presidential Succession, 9 Op. O.L.C. 65, 66 (1985)
(stating that Section 4 applies if the President is “unable or unwilling to transmit a declaration of
his inability . . . .”); see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, IMPEACHMENT: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE 141 (2017)
(stating that Section 4 applies when President is unwilling to recognize incapacity). But see
Gustafson, supra note 166 (arguing that Sections 3 and 4 are mutually exclusive).
109 CONG. REC. 24,421 (1963).
110 CONG. REC. 22,995 (1964) (statement of Sen. Alan Bible) (“What to do in the event a President
is unable or unwilling to recognize his disability . . . .”); 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 106, at 44
(statement of Professor James C. Kirby, Jr.) (describing Section 4 as addressing a situation where
the President “was unable to communicate . . . or where the President suffered from an inability of
which he was not aware or would not admit.”); id. at 151 (statement of John D. Feerick) (describing
ABA consensus as empowering the Vice President and Cabinet “where a President is disabled but
is unwilling or actually unable to make a determination.”); 111 CONG. REC. 3254 (1965) (statement
of Sen. Birch Bayh) (stating that Section 4 “provides for the eventuality that the President is unable
to make a declaration of his own inability, or for other reasons does not declare his own inability.”);
id. at 3262 (statement of Sen. Hiram Fong) (explaining that Vice President and Cabinet could
declare President disabled under Section 4 if he did not declare his inability under Section 3).
111 CONG. REC. 7938 (1965) (statement of Rep. Emanuel Celler) (stating that Section 4 applied to
“a situation where the President is unwilling or unable to declare his inability.”); id. at 7947
(statement of Rep. Robert McClory) (referring to situation where disabled President “is unwilling
or unable to relieve himself of the powers and duties” of the presidency); id. at 7955 (statement of
Rep. Dante Fascell) (stating that Section 4 would apply if “the President were unable to determine
his own inability, or if there were doubt or controversy about it . . . .”).
S. REP. NO. 89-66, at 6–7 (1965); H.R. REP. NO. 89-203, at 6–7 (1965); S. REP. NO. 88-1382, at 4–
6 (1964); see also Birch Bayh, The Twenty-fifth Amendment: Dealing with Presidential Disability, 30 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 437, 441, 450 (1995) (stating that Amendment was intended to deal with “historic
incidents” of presidential inability); SUNSTEIN, supra note 180, at 142–43 (recognizing significance
of Garfield, Wilson, and Eisenhower disabilities as well as hypothetical in which Kennedy was
disabled rather than killed).
111 CONG. REC. 7947 (1965) (statement of Rep. John V. Lindsay) (referring to Garfield and Wilson
disabilities); id. at 7949 (statement of Rep. Jeffrey Cohelan) (referring to Garfield, Wilson and
Eisenhower disabilities); id. at 7953 (statement of Rep. Charles E. Bennett) (referring to all three); id.
at 7955 (statement of Rep. Peter W. Rodino, Jr.) (“[W]e have had Presidents disabled for long
periods by assassins’ bullets or illness.”); id. at 3265 (statement of Sen. Frank Carlson) (referring to
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but unwilling, to declare his inability for much of the relevant period.186 For
instance, Wilson was conscious and competent to declare his inability for
much of its duration yet unwilling to do so.187
During the 1965 Senate hearings, Bayh stated that his proposal was
designed to address “any type of inability” including international travel,
communications breakdown, capture, “or anything that is imaginable. The
inability to perform the powers and duties of the office, for any reason is
inability under the terms that we are discussing.”188 Although the terms were
intended to have broad scope, Bayh said during the 1965 House hearings
that he did not anticipate the use of Section 4 by the Vice President and
Cabinet unless the President was “in pretty bad shape” and his condition was
“rather obvious.”189
When the Senate considered S.J. Res. 1 on February 19, 1965, Bayh
initially articulated his usual broad formulation that Section 4 applied when
the President was “unable” to declare his inability or “for other reasons does
not declare his own inability.”190 Later that day he gave a narrower
definition of “inability” and “unable” than he had during the 1965 Senate
hearings. In particular, following discussion with Senator Robert F.
Kennedy, Bayh said those words in Section 4 mean “an impairment of the
President’s faculties” such that “he is unable either to make or communicate
his decisions as to his own competency to execute the powers and duties of
his office.” Bayh stated he intended that statement to clarify the statement
given during the Senate hearings.191
Had the discussion ended there, Bayh’s statement would have suggested
a narrower definition since, taken literally, his formulation would seem to limit
“unable” and “inability” to the President’s ability to “make or communicate”
his decisions regarding his competency, and not to encompass situations in
which the President was simply unwilling to accept a judgment of his

186

187
188

189
190
191

Garfield, Wilson, and Eisenhower disabilities).
See, e.g., FEERICK, supra note 79, at 123–28, 136–38 (describing Garfield’s condition during 80 days
following shooting); Joel K. Goldstein, Vice-Presidential Behavior in a Disability Crisis: The Case of Thomas
R. Marshall, 33 POL. & LIFE SCI. 37, 41–45 (Fall 2014) (describing Wilson’s inability but
unwillingness to declare disability).
Goldstein, supra note 186, at 41–45; see JOHN MILTON COOPER, JR., WOODROW WILSON: A
BIOGRAPHY 535–78 (2009) (describing Wilson’s activities during the period following his stroke).
1965 Senate Hearings, supra note 76, at 20; see also id. at 9 (statement of Acting Att’y Gen. Nicholas
Katzenbach) (stating that Section 4 and 5 of S.J. Res. 1 applied to the “extraordinary situations—
where the President cannot or does not declare his own inability . . . . ”).
1965 House Hearings, supra note 110, at 82.
111 CONG. REC. 3254 (1965); see also id. at 3262 (statement of Sen. Hiram Fong) (stating that
Section 4 applies if President does not declare his own inability).
Id. at 3282.
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incapacity even though apparent to others. The discussion did not end there,
however, and its continuation clarified and expanded Bayh’s explanation of
the phrases. Later in the same debate, Bayh stated that “[w]e are talking
about a President who is unable to perform the powers and duties of his
office,”192 thereby reaffirming that the touchstone remained the President’s
ability “to perform the powers and duties of his office,” not simply his ability
to make and communicate decisions regarding his competency.
The terms were further clarified when the Senate considered the
conference report on June 30, 1965. In a colloquy with Senator Robert F.
Kennedy, Bayh resisted the suggestion that the proposed amendment
addressed “total inability” since he said that a President “might be physically
able” but “might not possess the mental capacity to make a decision and
perform the powers and duties of his office. We are talking about inability
to perform the constitutional duties of the office of President.”193 When
Kennedy again suggested that what was meant was “total inability to
perform the powers and duties of office,” Bayh agreed but promptly qualified
his answer by repeating that inability did not involve a President who made
an “unpopular decision.”194 Bayh’s qualification suggested that he was
excluding a relatively narrow set of circumstances. Bayh later referred to an
inability “that would seriously impair the President’s ability to perform the
powers and duties of his office,”195 a reference that further rejected the “total
inability” limitation for a “seriously impair” formulation. Bayh resisted the
idea that inability was limited to “mental disability” since a President might,
for instance, be unable to perform because he had been captured by an
enemy.196 When Kennedy said inability “involves physical or mental
inability to make or communicate his decision regarding his capacity and
physical or mental inability to exercise the powers and duties of his office”
Bayh agreed and he and Kennedy described this statement as Bayh’s
February 19, 1965, definition.197

192
193

194
195
196
197

Id. at 3282–83 (statements of Sen. Philip Hart and Sen. Birch Bayh).
111 CONG. REC. 15,381(1965); see also 1965 House Hearings, supra note 110, at 45–46 (statement of
Sen. Birch Bayh) (imagining a situation where Vice President and Cabinet majority might tell a
President who could “walk and talk” that “the best interest of the country” called for the Vice
President to continue to act as President since the President was “not recovered.”); 111 CONG. REC.
3254–55 (1965) (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh) (discussing the possibility that a President who can
“walk and talk” is not “sufficiently recovered” and the “best interests” of the nation mandate the
Vice President’s continued action).
111 CONG. REC. 15,381(1965).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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But Kennedy’s June 30, 1965, formulation which Bayh embraced was
much broader than Bayh’s February 1965 statement. The June 30 statement
specifically included inability to exercise presidential powers and duties as
well as to make or communicate a decision regarding the same. Bayh’s
reference to “seriously impair the President’s ability to perform the powers
and duties of his office” reinforced the broader definition and implicitly
rejected the idea that a “total” inability was required. Indeed, Kennedy
understood that the terms went beyond the February 1965 statement because
he opened his discussion on June 30, 1965, by describing Section 4 as the
provision that allowed others to decide that the President was disabled when
he was “unwilling to make the declaration of inability himself.”198
During the House’s deliberations on April 13, 1965, key representatives
interpreted the terms broadly. Celler said Section 4 addressed the situation
where the President was “unwilling or unable to declare his inability.”199
McCulloch described Section 4 as applying if “[the President] should fail to
[declare his inability] or in the case where he is too ill to do so[.]”200 Poff
defined the cases falling within Section 4 in way that was generally consistent
with Bayh’s June 30, 1965, formulation. He described them as those “in
which the President, by reason of physical or mental debility, is unable to
perform his duties but is unable or unwilling to make a rational decision to
relinquish the powers of his office, even for a temporary period.”201 He
offered “two illustrative examples” of the cases within Section 4 as ones
where the President “by reason of some physical ailment or some sudden
accident is unconscious or paralyzed and therefore unable to make or to
communicate the decision to relinquish” presidential powers or when “the
President, by reason of mental debility, is unable or unwilling to make any
rational decision, including particularly the decision to stand aside.”202 Poff’s
definition, like the Bayh June 30, 1965, formulation, clearly applied to
physical or mental disability to perform as well as to make or communicate
a decision regarding inability. Two articles Feerick wrote, which were
published shortly after Congress proposed the Amendment and were widelycirculated during the period in which states considered ratification, made
clear that Section 4 applied in situations where the President either could not

198
199
200
201
202

Id. at 15,380.
Id. at 7938.
Id. at 7942.
Id. at 7941.
Id.; see also Richard H. Poff, Presidential Inability and the Twenty-fifth Amendment, 11 STUDENT L.J. 15,
16–17 (Dec. 1965) (discussing two categories to which Section 4 applies).
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or would not declare his disability.203
As previously noted, the Garfield and Wilson inabilities helped inspire
the Amendment’s presidential inability provisions. A decade after Congress
proposed the Amendment to the states, Bayh said Section 4 was supposed to
address “a Woodrow Wilson situation, where the President may be at least
partially impaired but doesn’t realize it.”204 More generally, framers of the
Amendment, like Bayh205 and Feerick206 have continued to make clear that
Section 4 was to apply when a President is unwilling to recognize a mental
or physical disability.
The very structure of Section 4 further rebuts the suggestion that it is
limited to situations when the President cannot make or communicate a
decision regarding his inability. As will be discussed below, Section 4
includes procedures whereby after a President is declared disabled, the Vice
President and a majority of the Cabinet can contest the President’s
declaration that he is able to resume discharging presidential powers and
duties, subject to review by the houses of Congress. The procedures
contemplate that, even though the President has declared himself fit to
handle his responsibilities, he may be precluded from doing so in some cases
for almost a month while first the executive branch and then Congress decide
whether he is in fact able to resume. And if the constitutional decision-

203

204
205

206

See Feerick, supra note 124, at 199–200 (stating that Section 4 “covers the most difficult case, that
is, where the President cannot or refuses to declare his own inability.”); John D. Feerick, Proposed
Amendment on Presidential Inability and Vice-Presidential Vacancy, 51 A.B.A. J. 915, 916 (1965) (stating that
Section 4 was “intended to cover situations in which the President is unable to declare his own
inability or in which he refuses to do so when disabled.”); see also American Bar Association & John
D. Feerick, Presidential Inability and Vice Presidential Vacancy: With Questions and Answers (1965) (stating
that the President can be declared disabled if he “is unable to so declare . . . or if he refuses to
declare his inability, as in case of mental infirmity.”).
Examination, supra note 125, at 58.
Birch Bayh, Reflections on the Twenty-fifth Amendment as We Enter a New Century, in MANAGING CRISIS:
PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY AND THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT 55, 58 (Robert E. Gilbert ed.,
2000) (stating that Section 4 “provides for those occasions when the president is unable or unwilling
to act voluntarily.”); Bayh, supra note 184, at 441 (“Section 4, clause 1 provides for those instances
when the President is unable or unwilling to act of his own volition.”).
See, e.g., FEERICK, supra note 10, at 115 (stating that Section 4 covers situations when President
“cannot or does not” declare himself disabled); Feerick, supra note 5, at 925 (“This section covers
the most difficult cases of inability—when the President cannot or refuses to declare his own
inability.”); see also Operation of the Twenty-fifth Amendment Respecting Presidential Succession, supra note 180,
at 66 (stating that Section 4 applies when President is unable or unwilling to declare his inability);
ROSE MCDERMOTT, PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP, ILLNESS, AND DECISION MAKING 205 (2008)
(stating that Section 4 applies to a President who is unwilling or unable to declare inability); Robert
E. Gilbert, The Genius of the Twenty-fifth Amendment: Guarding Against Presidential Disability but Safeguarding
the Presidency, in MANAGING CRISIS: PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY AND THE TWENTY-FIFTH
AMENDMENT 25, 33 (Robert E. Gilbert ed., 2000) (stating that Section 4 applies when a disabled
President is unable or unwilling to transfer presidential powers).
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makers conclude that the conscious President is disabled, notwithstanding his
insistence to the contrary, he can be precluded from exercising presidential
powers and duties for a longer period, until at least one of the decisionmakers changes its mind. That period could, theoretically, last for the rest of
the presidential term. The inclusion of that mechanism makes clear that the
Amendment envisions that a President could be conscious and able to
communicate his decision—that he was fit to handle the responsibilities of
his office—and yet be prevented from doing so because he is disabled.
Of course, those specific checks apply when the President has been
previously determined through the Section 4 procedure to be unable to
discharge the presidency, not before the initial determination. Yet that
distinction is irrelevant to this discussion which focuses on the meaning of the
Section 4 language. It would be ludicrous for the Amendment to preclude
a previously declared disabled President from resuming the exercise of
presidential powers and duties, notwithstanding his vigorous insistence on his
fitness, but prevent the initial transfer of those same powers and duties from
a disabled President simply because he was conscious and able to
communicate. Such a bizarre statement should be rejected absent
constitutional language compelling it.
This discussion provides some basis to address some of the claims
regarding the alleged ambiguity or scope of the standard. The lack of
definition represented a deliberate effort to preserve flexibility. Consistent
with its text, Section 4 is available to address a wide range of mental and
physical ailments and logistical impediments that could incapacitate a
President. Bayh’s definition on February 19, 1965, is the sole support in the
legislative record for the proposition that Section 4 was “designed” for a
situation where the President could not communicate his inability. But that
single utterance was narrower than his many prior and subsequent
statements, including those during the extensive discussion on June 30, 1965,
of Section 4 immediately prior to the Senate’s final action on the Amendment
a week later. Its distinct outlier status, and the fact that Bayh returned to a
much broader formulation during the Senate’s later deliberation, counsels
against giving the February 19, 1965, interpretation weight.207 Similarly, the
House leaders most responsible for H.R.J. Res. 1, Celler, McCulloch and
Poff, all articulated the broader standard as discussed above, including when
the House gave its most extended floor consideration of the measure some
two months after the Senate’s February discussion. Moreover, the text and
structure of the Amendment makes clear its wider application.
207

But see Gustafson, supra note 166, at 482–83 (relying on February 19, 1965, statement and
minimizing importance of far broader Bayh statement on June 30, 1965).
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A presidential inability under Section 4 should be one, as Bayh said, that
“seriously” impairs the President and the evidence should be clear, but the
President need not be “absolutely and unambiguously incapable—like John
F. Kennedy was, in the hours between when he was shot and when he died”
as Zimmerman contended.208 The period between Kennedy’s shooting and
death did not last “hours”209 but, in any event, that example presented the
extreme case. The framers of the Amendment thought that Garfield, Wilson,
and Eisenhower were disabled and were appropriate candidates for Section
4 treatment had it existed during their terms yet none approached Kennedy’s
condition during the moments between the shooting and his death. During
most of the period following his September 1919 stroke through the last
seventeen months of his presidency, Wilson made some decisions and even
held Cabinet meetings beginning in spring 1920, yet legislative materials
surrounding the creation and proposal of the Amendment were predicated
on the conclusion that he was disabled at least during much of that time. The
fact that a President could sign a paper (as did Garfield and Wilson),210 meet
with some congressmen and the Cabinet (Wilson),211 or fire a secretary of
state (Wilson)212 or wave from the window did not render him able to
discharge presidential powers and duties if he or she otherwise was not up to
those demands.
The framers also assumed that presidential inability determinations
would be based on facts regarding the President’s physical or mental
condition and the needs of the country. When the inability involved a
medical condition, the Amendment presumed that the Vice President and
Cabinet would act based upon “adequate consultation with medical experts
who were intricately familiar with the President’s physical and mental
condition.”213 Numerous comments during hearings and floor debates
echoed the assumption that decision-makers at all stages would consult with
appropriate medical authorities.

208
209
210
211
212
213

Zimmerman, supra note 167.
LARRY J. SABATO, THE KENNEDY HALF CENTURY: THE PRESIDENCY, ASSASSINATION, AND
LASTING LEGACY OF JOHN F. KENNEDY 209 (2013).
FEERICK, supra note 79, at 126 (regarding Garfield); id. at 173 (regarding Wilson).
Id. at 179–80.
Id. at 176–78.
S. REP. NO. 89-66, at 13 (1965); see also H.R. REP. NO. 89-203, at 13 (1965) (same); S. REP. NO. 881382, at 12 (1964) (same); 111 CONG. REC. 7939 (1965) (statement of Rep. Richard H. Poff) (stating
expectation that decision-makers would consult with medical experts); id. (statement of Rep. Clark
MacGregor) (stating expectation that Vice President and Cabinet would consult with “the very
finest medical brains . . . available”); Bayh, supra note 184, at 444 (calling for reliance on medical
advice if disability involves physical or mental illness).
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They also thought that the Vice President and Cabinet would have
relevant information that would contribute to a decision in many
circumstances. They would be “most familiar with [the president’s]
condition.”214 They would also be familiar with domestic and international
events to gauge the potential need for presidential action.215 In other words,
the observations of presidential behavior of informed laypeople were also
deemed relevant.
The record also suggests that presidential inability may be circumstantial.
Section 4 might apply to a short inability if a President were briefly
unconscious when missiles were deployed.216 In essence, whether a President
was “unable to perform the powers and duties” of the presidency was a
contextual question that had to weigh the President’s condition and situation
and the domestic and international stage. It often could not be determined
based on predetermined specific formulas and Section 4 certainly was
designed to be applied in some situations when a President was conscious
and able to communicate yet not able to discharge the powers and duties of
the presidency.
Those who have construed Section 4 narrowly overlook the fact that
much of the limitation it provided came from procedural, not definitional,
constraints. Unless Congress replaced the Cabinet, the initial decisionmakers were presumed presidential loyalists who owed their positions to the
chief executive. By the mid-1960s, the practice of Presidents choosing their
running mates was entrenched217 and the framers of the Amendment saw the
Vice President as a close personal and political ally of the President.218
Although they overstated the case at the time, subsequent history has
developed consistent with their vision.219 Historically Vice Presidents had
been reluctant to act,220 a lesson which somewhat calmed anxiety over the
214
215

216
217
218
219
220

H. R. Rep. No. 89-203, at 13 (1965); S. Rep. No. 89-66, at 13 (1965); S. Rep. No. 88-1382, at 11–
12 (1964).
See, e.g., H. R. REP. NO. 89-203, at 13 (1965) (stating that the Vice President and the Cabinet would
be “the most feasible formula” to make decisions about the President’s condition because of their
familiarity with the President’s condition); S. REP. NO. 89-66, at 13 (1965) (same); S. REP. NO. 881382, at 11–12 (1964) (same); 111 CONG. REC. 7941 (1965) (statement of Rep. Richard H. Poff)
(discussing knowledge of the Vice President and Cabinet regarding the President and his health);
FEERICK, supra note 10, at 59 (summarizing advantages of including Cabinet in decision-making).
111 CONG. REC. 15,381(1965) (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh) (explaining that Section 4 might
apply to a short inability if the President were unconscious during a missile attack on the country).
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 6, at 24.
Goldstein, supra note 4, at 530–36.
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 6, at 27, 29–35, 293, 301.
See S. REP. NO. 89-66, at 6 (1965) (referring to two occasions when the Vice President failed to
assume the duties of the President when the President was disabled); Poff, supra note 202, at 17
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prospect of usurpation of power. The Cabinet was seen as a group that was
also loyal to, and in regular contact with, the President.221 Accordingly, the
framers of the Amendment thought that the triggering procedures in Section
4 would protect the President from improper treatment. The requirement
that the Vice President receive a two-thirds vote in both houses to sustain his
position against a presidential “no disability” declaration provided further
assurance that Section 4 would not be lightly used. Right after explaining
the decision not to define the terms, Poff underscored the reliance on a
procedural approach when he said “[i]t is highly unlikely that the responsible
Government officials entrusted with this great power would abuse it by
declaring a President elected by the people of this country disabled when in
fact he was not, especially when the Congress is given the ultimate voice in
this determination.”222
Poff’s statement discloses a premise inherent in the thinking of the
framers of the Amendment. They expected the decision-makers in the
executive and legislative branches to act as patriots, not partisans. The
legislative record included many references to this expectation that
responsible officials would rise to the occasion and discharge their duty.223
The common suppositions in recent discussions that co-partisans would not
act against a President of their party may be accurate but, if they are, they
reflect a more cynical view of human nature than that of the architects of the
Twenty-fifth Amendment.
As a practical matter, decision-makers will probably hesitate to declare a
President disabled when he could have, but did not, invoke Section 3.224 And
declaring a conscious President disabled certainly presents challenges not

221
222
223

224

(noting that Vice Presidents had historically been reluctant to act); Goldstein, supra note 4, at 541
(discussing historic reluctance of Vice Presidents to act to address presidential inability and response
of Twenty-fifth Amendment).
See, e.g., Poff, supra note 202, at 17.
111 CONG. REC. 7941 (1965) (statement of Rep. Richard H. Poff).
See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 89-66, at 13 (1965) (presuming that “we shall always be dealing with ‘reasonable
men’ at the highest governmental level.”); H. R. REP. NO. 89-203, at 13 (1965) (same); S. REP. NO.
88-1382, at 11 (1964) (same); see also 111 CONG. REC. 15,591–92 (1965) (statement of Sen. Everett
Dirksen) (expressing faith that executive officials would declare President disabled in appropriate
case); id. at 15,592 (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh) (stating that American people would not tolerate
behavior by Vice President that was not in national interest); id. at 3254 (statement of Sen. Birch
Bayh) (stating the Vice President has “constitutional obligation” to act when President is disabled
and the nation’s welfare demands it); Feerick, supra note 124, at 202 (arguing that history suggests
the Cabinet would recognize presidential inability where appropriate).
Joel K. Goldstein, The Vice-Presidency and the Twenty-fifth Amendment: The Power of Reciprocal Relationships,
in MANAGING CRISIS: PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY AND THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT 165,
196–98 (Robert E. Gilbert ed., 2000).
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present when the President is unconscious. The factual evidence is likely to
be less clear when the President is conscious, the political costs may be
increased, and greater discretion is required since the President may retaliate
if he learns of Section 4 deliberations before action is taken.225 Yet, these
enhanced challenges should not lead to the conclusion that Section 4 was
designed exclusively for an unconscious President. It was not. If Section 4
was only intended for such limited circumstances, the record would not
contain so many references to medical consultations, psychiatrists, or the
possibility of examining the President, in addition to the other discussions
recounted above which make clear that Section 4 applied to a President who
was unwilling to declare his inability as well as one who was unable to do so.
The materials presented above make clear that Section 4 applies more
broadly to serious impairments that disable a President, including those the
President should, but is unwilling to, acknowledge.
It is also unlikely that the Vice President and Cabinet would base a
disability determination on a condition fully known to voters at the prior
election absent some worsening. The framers of the Amendment may have
expected some deterioration in the President’s condition as the normal
predicate for a Section 4 decision,226 yet the text of Section 4 does not
preclude its use in such circumstances.227 It applies “Whenever” the Vice
President and Cabinet transmit the requisite communication based on a
determination that the President is unable to discharge his powers and duties.
Indeed, Section 4 is predicated on the belief that the Vice President and
Cabinet, from working closely with the President, and in consultation with
his doctors, might detect presidential incapacity that would not be visible to
those lacking such unique access.
Hypotheticals based on historic events help illustrate circumstances when
a Vice President and Cabinet might find a President disabled although the
electorate had knowledge regarding a prior affliction. Eisenhower was reelected in 1956 following his September 1955 heart attack that largely
sidelined him for about four months,228 as well as his June 1956 emergency
225
226

227

228

Id.
See, e.g., 111 CONG. REC. 15,593 (1965) (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh) (stating that Section 4 would
address the situation where the President, “although physically able, is not the man, from a
substantive point, who was previously elected to that office.”).
Cf. YALE LAW SCHOOL RULE OF LAW CLINIC, supra note 8, at 22 (“A President who cannot
demonstrate the minimal competence to rationally perform the duties of the office might be deemed
constitutionally unable, even if signs of that deficiency were clear at the time of the President’s
selection to the term in which he sits.”).
IRWIN GELLMAN, THE PRESIDENT AND THE APPRENTICE: EISENHOWER AND NIXON, 1952–
1961 272 (2015).
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ileitis surgery. Unbeknownst to the public, two of Eisenhower’s three doctors
(and both of his cardiologists) had urged him not to seek re-election due to
health concerns.229 During the campaign, Eisenhower’s opponents publicly
predicted that Eisenhower was unlikely to survive a second term and his reelection would result in Nixon succeeding to the presidency.230 In fact,
Eisenhower completed his term, although he did experience a stroke that
affected his speech and forced him to miss some commitments, as well as
some other heart ailments during his second term that were largely
unreported until after his presidency ended.231
Yet imagine that Section 4 existed during Eisenhower’s second term and
that Nixon and the Cabinet had determined that Eisenhower’s heart
ailments rendered him unable to perform his duties. The fact that the public
knew of his heart attack, yet re-elected him in 1956, presumably should not
have precluded the invocation of Section 4 if otherwise appropriate.
Section 4 was not, however, intended as a mechanism to express no
confidence in a President who makes unpopular decisions or who is deemed
to lack sufficient talent. When Senator Philip Hart asked, “Is it clear that this
means far more than disagreement with respect to a judgment he may make,
a decision he may make with respect to incapacity and inability, or must it
be based upon a judgment that is very far reaching?” Bayh replied “that we
are not dealing with an unpopular decision that must be made in time of trial
and which might render the President unpopular. We are talking about a
President who is unable to perform the powers and duties of his office.”232
Bayh’s response made clear that Section 4 was not a “no confidence” vehicle
against a President whose popularity had plummeted. Feerick concluded
that the legislative record “made clear that unpopularity, incompetence,
impeachable conduct, poor judgment, and laziness do not constitute an
‘inability’ within the meaning of the Amendment.”233 The apparent framers’
intent would tend to cut against the sorts of extensions of Section 4 that
Posner, Dallek, Graber, and others have suggested unless these qualities or
misconduct were associated with a physical or mental disability.

229
230
231
232

233

ROBERT E. GILBERT, THE MORTAL PRESIDENCY: ILLNESS AND ANGUISH IN THE WHITE HOUSE
97 (1998).
Id. at 105.
Id. at 106–16.
111 CONG. REC. 3282–83 (1965) (statements of Sen. Philip Hart and Sen. Birch Bayh); see also id.
at 15,381 (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh) (stating Section 4 did not apply to President who made an
unpopular decision).
FEERICK, supra note 10, at 117; see also SUNSTEIN, supra note 180, at 144, 148 (noting the same).
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D. Who Decides?
Some writers have misstated the group Section 4 empowers to act with the
Vice President absent congressional action. Historian Joshua Zeitz wrote that
Section 4 was “ambiguous” on several points including who were the
“principal officers of the executive departments” who are empowered to act
with the Vice President. Zeitz said that phrase could mean Cabinet members,
although he pointed out that some officials have Cabinet status without serving
as department heads. He predicted that litigation would be inevitable.234
Professor David Pozen of Columbia Law School criticized the Amendment for
failing to define “principal heads of the executive departments” and suggested
controversy on the subject among its proponents.235
In fact, the group that acts with the Vice President is authoritatively
defined in the legislative history and the Supreme Court has so recognized.
A brief summary of this issue that received considerable attention236 reveals
the clarity with which Section 4 resolved this issue generally.
The proposed Amendment, as introduced in the Senate and House in
1965, provided in Section 4 that “the Vice President with the written
concurrence of a majority of the heads of the executive departments or such
other body as Congress may by law provide” could declare the President
disabled if he did not invoke Section 3.237 The Senate Subcommittee on
Constitutional Amendments modified the language in S.J. Res. 1 on February
4, 1965, to replace “heads of the executive departments” with “principal
officers of the executive departments.”238 Under questioning by several
members of the judiciary committee of the House of Representatives,239 Bayh
234

235

236
237
238
239

Zeitz, supra note 165; see also Z. Byron Wolff, Using the 25th Amendment to Depose Trump Would Require a
Cabinet Mutiny, CNN, https://www.cnn.com/2017/10/12/politics/25th-amendment-donald-trumpsteve-bannon-mike-pence/index.html (last updated Oct. 30, 2017, 2:38 PM) (implying incorrectly that
the White House Chief of Staff, U.S. Trade Representative, Director of National Intelligence, United
Nations representative, Director of OMB, CIA, Administrator of EPA, and Small Business
Administration are among the Section 4 decision-makers).
David Pozen, The Deceptively Clear Twenty-fifth Amendment, CONST. CTR. (July 11, 2018),
https://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-constitution/amendments/amendment-xxv/thedeceptively-clear-twenty-fifth-amendment-by-david-pozen/interp/42 (questioning what are the
“executive departments” and who are the “principal officers” of these departments).
FEERICK, supra note 10, at 117 (“Few subjects received as much attention as that of the composition
of the Cabinet.”).
S.J. Res. 1, 89th Cong. (1965); H.R.J. Res. 1, 89th Cong. (1965).
1965 House Hearings, supra note 110, at 42–43.
Id. at 52–53 (questions by Rep. Basil L. Whitener); id. at 55–56 (questions by Rep. Byron G. Rogers);
id. at 58–59 (questions by Rep. Basil L. Whitener); id. at 59–60 (questions by Rep. Arch A. Moore,
Jr.); id. at 60–61 (questions by Rep. Charles McC. Mathias, Jr.); id. at 61 (questions by Rep. William
M. McCulloch).
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had testified on February 9, 1965, that the new formulation did not include
the heads of the army, navy and air force, or of the atomic energy commission,
the ambassador to the United Nations, or director of the poverty program,240
but rather referred to the Cabinet.241 Chairman Celler suggested that the
issue should be clarified and that Attorney General Katzenbach might
enlighten the legislators when he appeared.242 When Katzenbach followed
Bayh to the stand, he advised that the term could be authoritatively defined
in the committee report.243 The Senate report the following day stated the
conclusion of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary that the new
formulation “more adequately conveys the intended meaning of [S]ections 4
and 5, that only those members of the President’s official Cabinet were to
participate in any decision of disability referred to under these [S]ections” and
noted that the language was taken from the Opinions Clause in Article II.244
The following month, the House Judiciary Committee included in the report
accompanying H.R.J. Res. 1 the statement that the term “principal officers of
the executive departments” was limited to “the Presidential appointees who
direct the 10 executive departments named in 5 U.S.C. 1, or any executive
department established in the future, generally considered to comprise the
President’s Cabinet . . . .”245 Representative Celler, the chair of the House
Judiciary Committee and an author of the ultimate amendment, specifically
referenced that statement from the legislative report in the April 13, 1965,
House debate in response to a question,246 and McCulloch247 and Poff,248 the
two principal Republican sponsors of H.R.J. Res. 1 as amended,249 echoed
that interpretation. In the Senate, Senator Philip Hart specifically asked
whether “the heads of the executive departments” referred to those identified
in 5 U.S.C. 1 and 2; Bayh agreed that it did.250 In other words, the principal
240
241
242
243
244
245
246
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248

249
250

Id. at 52, 59–61 (statements of Sen. Birch Bayh).
Id. at 45, 52.
Id. at 61–62 (statements of Rep. Emanuel Celler).
Id. at 103 (statements of Att’y Gen. Nicholas Katzenbach).
S. REP. NO. 89–66, at 2 (1965).
H.R. REP. NO. 89-203, at 3 (1965).
111 CONG. REC. 7944 (1965) (statement of Rep. Emanuel Celler); see also id. at 7944–7945
(statements of Rep. Emanuel Celler and Rep. Basil L. Whitener); id at 7946 (statements of Rep.
Emanuel Celler and Rep. Edward Hutchinson).
See id. at 7945 (statement of Rep. William M. McCulloch) (agreeing with Rep. Celler’s definition
of principal officers of the executive departments).
See id. at 7941 (statement of Rep. Richard H. Poff) (interpreting Section 4 to refer to the Vice
President and the Cabinet); see also Poff, supra note 202, at 17 (relying on 5 U.S.C. § 1 to identify
principal officers of the executive branch).
Goldstein, supra note 104, at 1162–66 (discussing the contributions of the two Republican sponsors).
111 CONG. REC. 3283 (1965) (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh); see also 1965 House Hearings, supra note
110, at 52 (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh) (stating that Section 4 language refers to Cabinet members
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proponents in each house articulated the same definition during floor debate
preceding votes.
The Office of Legal Counsel in the Department of Justice reached the
same conclusion when it studied the issue in 1985.251 At that point, the
pertinent code provision listed 13 such officials, beginning with the secretary
of state and extending through the secretary of education.252
The Supreme Court has specifically recognized that “executive
department” as used in Section 4 of the Twenty-fifth Amendment means
“Cabinet-level entities.”253 It noted “the fact that the Amendment strictly
limits the term ‘department’ to those departments named in 5 U.S.C. §
101 . . . .”254 Justice Scalia (and the three justices who joined his dissent)
agreed that, as used in Section 4, “the phrase ‘the principal officers of the
executive departments’ is limited to members of the Cabinet” although
different reasoning brought him to that conclusion.255
Unless Congress creates some “other body” to act with the Vice
President,256 thereby supplanting the Cabinet,257 Section 4 refers to the
“principal officers” of the (now) 15 executive departments beginning with the

251

252
253

254
255

256

257

only); id. at 55–56 (statement of Rep. Byron G. Rogers and Sen. Birch Bayh) (stating that Section
4 decision-makers are Vice President and Cabinet); id. at 58–60 (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh)
(stating members of Cabinet were intended); id. at 60–62 (agreeing issue should be clarified by the
Attorney General). The contemporaneous writings of John Feerick in 1965, which were widely
circulated during the ratification period, confirm this meaning. Feerick, supra note 124, at 200 &
n.144 (confirming that Section 4 language refers to specified officers who serve in Cabinet); Feerick,
supra note 203, at 916 & n.7 (confirming that Section 4 language refers to specified officers who
serve in Cabinet).
Operation of the Twenty-fifth Amendment Respecting Presidential Succession, supra note 180, at 69 (explaining
that the heads of departments listed in 5 U.S.C. § 101 are the “principal officers of the executive
departments” for the purposes of the Twenty-fifth Amendment).
Id.
See Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 887 (1991) (stating that “it is instructive that the hearings on
the Twenty-fifth Amendment confirm that the term ‘department’ refers to Cabinet-level
entities . . . .”).
Id. at 887 n.4.
See id. at 917 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (accepting that “the
phrase ‘principal officers of the of the executive departments’ is limited to members of the Cabinet”
because of the structural composition of the phrase).
The text and legislative record make clear that the Vice President is an indispensable party to a
Section 4 presidential inability determination. See, e.g., FEERICK, supra note 10, at 121 (stating that
Congress cannot remove the Vice President from the process); Goldstein, supra note 4, at 527
(describing the Vice President as the “indispensable participant” in Section 4 determinations).
The legislative record makes clear that if Congress creates “such other body” it supplants the
Cabinet; the Vice President does not have the luxury of shopping between them for a party. See,
e.g., FEERICK, supra note 10, at 121 (stating that the legislative history “clearly shows” that if
Congress creates an “other body” that body “replaces the Cabinet” as the body that acts with the
Vice President).
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department of state and extending to the department of homeland
security.258 There is some uncertainty regarding whether an under secretary
can act if the top job is vacant since different views were expressed259 or
whether a recess appointee could serve.260 There is none, however,
regarding who are the “principal heads of the executive departments.”
E. The Consequence of Section 4
Some scholars and other commentators have erroneously described
Section 4 as a means to permanently remove a President. Josh Gerstein of
Politico referred to the Twenty-fifth Amendment as a “provision to remove a
president from office.”261 Law professor Mark Graber wrote that Trump
“plainly meets the standards for removal from office under the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment.”262 Ian Tuttle of the National Review spoke of Section 4 as a
means to remove Trump from office.263 Professor Turley characterized
Section 4 as providing for “permanent . . . removal from power”264 and as a
means to “end . . . the Trump administration.”265 John Hudak of the
Brookings Institution properly distinguished between removing the
President’s powers and removing him from office but mischaracterized the
two-thirds vote of the House and Senate as one “to permanently strip the
powers of the presidency away from the president and transfer them to the
vice president.”266 Later, he repeated the claim that a two-thirds vote of each

258
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260
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262
263
264
265
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5 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
Compare H.R. REP. NO. 89-203, at 3 (1965) (expressing view that under secretaries could participate)
with 111 CONG. REC. 3284 (1965) (statement of Sen. Bayh) (stating his opinion that they could not).
Feerick summarizes the arguments and states persuasively that the House Judiciary Committee’s
view is preferable. It also appears to have been the predominant view of those who expressed an
opinion. FEERICK, supra note 10, at 117–18; see also Operation of the Twenty-fifth Amendment Respecting
Presidential Succession, supra note 180, at 69 (stating that under secretary, principal deputy, or recess
appointee “might” be able to act in absence of department head).
Operation of the Twenty-fifth Amendment Respecting Presidential Succession, supra note 180, at 69 (stating that
recess appointee “might” be able to act in absence of department head).
Josh Gerstein, 25th Amendment Unlikely to Be Invoked over Trump’s Mental Health, POLITICO (Jan. 7,
2018, 8:08 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/01/07/trump-25th-amendment-mentalhealth-327503; see id. (referring to “amendment’s language on what could lead a president to be
involuntarily removed from office . . . . ”).
Graber, supra note 56.
Tuttle, supra note 34.
Turley, supra note 47.
Turley, supra note 48; see also Shear, supra note 62 (incorrectly stating that if two-thirds in each house
voted that Trump was disabled Trump would be “stripped permanently” of the presidency and
Pence would “become president.”).
John Hudak, The 25th Amendment, BROOKINGS: UNPACKED (June 9, 2017),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/unpacked/2017/06/09/the-25th-amendment/; see also Hudak,
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house would effect “permanent removal” of presidential powers from the
President.267
Two points merit noting. First, on their face, the inability provisions of
the Amendment do not remove the President from office. They simply
transfer presidential powers and duties to the Vice President while the
President retains his office. They separate presidential powers and duties
from the President, but the President remains President and may reclaim the
powers and duties of the office under Sections 3 and 4.268 Indeed, the
concept that a disabled President should simply lose presidential powers and
duties, not the presidency, was a central premise of the Twenty-fifth
Amendment.
Historically, handling presidential inability had been
complicated by the fear that if the Vice President exercised presidential
powers and duties he would become President, thereby displacing the
incumbent.269 The concern related to the fact that the original vicepresidential succession clause was textually ambiguous. It provided that
upon the President’s removal, death, resignation “or Inability to discharge
the Powers and Duties of the said Office, the Same shall devolve on the Vice
President.”270 The clause was unclear whether “the Same” which devolved
on the Vice President was the presidency or simply the “Powers and Duties”
of the presidency. Notwithstanding this ambiguity, the text mandated that
the same thing devolved in all four contingencies. Practice had led to the
belief that upon a presidential death, the Vice President became President

267

268

269

270

supra note 62 (stating that vote of two-thirds of each house of Congress “permanently” makes Vice
President acting President); id. (referring to all Democrats voting “to remove the president from
office permanently.”).
Hudak, supra note 266. But see Jon Meacham, Could the 25th Amendment Be Trump’s Downfall? Here’s
How It Works, TIME (Jan. 11, 2018), http://time.com/5098402/could-the-25th-amendment-betrumps-downfall/ (last updated Jan. 26, 2018, 12:37 PM) (noting correctly that the President could
make repeated challenges to restore presidential powers to him); Andrew Prokop, The 25th
Amendment, Explained: How a President can Be Declared Unfit to Serve, VOX,
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/2/9/14488980/25th-amendment-trump-pence
(last updated Jan. 12, 2018, 10:32 AM) (explaining, in a different context, that the President only
loses his powers, not his office).
See 1965 House Hearings, supra note 110, at 78 (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh) (stating that “we hope
and pray to God that the disability will be removed. With this amendment, the President can
reassume his powers and duties, and if he is replaced by the Vice President, that the Vice President
can resume the powers and duties of his own office.”).
See, e.g., FEERICK, supra note 79, at 133–34, 237–38 (explaining concern before the Twenty-fifth
Amendment that if a Vice President acted as President during a presidential inability the Vice
President would supplant the President for the remainder of the presidential term ); RUTH C.
SILVA, PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION 52, 55–57 (1951) (explaining that the Vice President was not
called upon to act as President during the Garfield and Wilson disabilities due to fear that such
action would displace the incapacitated President).
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6.
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and since the Constitution treated death and disability symmetrically vis-àvis the Vice President, some argued that a presidential inability would lead
to the displacement of the President by the Vice President. That had
inhibited Vice Presidents from acting when Presidents were disabled and had
deterred presidential associates from encouraging them to do so.271
The Twenty-fifth Amendment proceeded on the assumption that much of
the problem regarding presidential inability could be solved by clarifying that
the Vice President could simply act as, not become, President, and that she
could do so for a time limited to the period during which the President was
disabled. Indeed, three of the four clauses of the Amendment reflected this
idea. Whereas the Vice President became President under Section 1 following
a presidential death, resignation or removal, she simply acted as President
while remaining Vice President during a presidential inability. Under
Section 3 or 4 the Vice President assumes presidential powers and duties, not
the “office,” as “Acting President.”272 Section 3 and 4 emphasize that the
President remains President by describing how he can resume presidential
powers and duties and by referring to the presidency as “his” office even when
the Vice President exercises its powers and duties. Even if each house of
Congress votes by the requisite two-thirds majority that “the President is
unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office,” the “Vice President”
continues to discharge those powers and duties (not the office) as “Acting
President.” The Vice President can never become President under Section 4.
These textual clues lead to the second point. Section 4 does not
“permanently” remove presidential powers from the President. Even if
Congress supports the conclusion of the Vice President and Cabinet that the
President is disabled, the President can make repeated declarations that “no
inability exists” and can “resume the powers and duties of his office” either
upon subsequent acquiescence by the Vice President and Cabinet or if less
than two-thirds of either House vote her disabled within twenty-one days.273
271

272

273

See FEERICK, supra note 79, at 135–36 (explaining the decision of Garfield’s Cabinet not to ask Vice
President Chester A. Arthur to act as President owing to concerns that such action might supplant
Garfield); SILVA, supra note 269, at 52, 55–57 (discussing the Cabinet’s concerns of dispossessing
Garfield of presidential authority); Goldstein, supra note 3, at 674–76 (“The uncertainty prevented
the Cabinet from inviting Arthur to act as President although its members all though that
desirable.”).
See 1965 House Hearings, supra note 110, at 65 (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh) (stating that under
Sections 3 and 4, the Vice President does not “have the office of President but that of Acting
President.”); id. at 65 (statement of Rep. Richard H. Poff) (same); cf. 111 CONG. REC. 3252–53
(1965) (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh) (stating that the Vice President only assumes powers and
duties of the presidency, not the office itself pursuant to Section 3).
See FEERICK, supra note 10, at 120 (“Since an inability decision does not result in the President’s
removal from office, there is nothing to prevent him, after an adverse congressional decision, from
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Section 4 does not limit the President to only one “no inability” declaration.
Although it does not explicitly authorize the President to repeat the process,
it does not prohibit her from doing so and it strongly implies that she would
be able to repeat the process. Why else would the President remain
“President?” If the President only had one comeback chance, the
Amendment would have displaced her from office after an adverse vote by
the houses of Congress. Since a premise of Section 4 is that the President
should discharge presidential powers and duties unless there is reason to
think she is unable to discharge them, she retains office with the prospect of
recovering the powers and duties if her inability ends.
The legislative history supports this conclusion. Bayh stated that a
President who Congress found to be disabled could raise the issue again
although the “degree of frequency” of her appeals might affect Congress’s
disposition.274 Katzenbach,275 Representative John Lindsay,276 and Brownell
all opined that the President could raise multiple challenges.277
A corollary of the foregoing is that neither Section 3 nor 4 trigger a vicepresidential vacancy as some have incorrectly suggested.278 Even if the
President’s inability becomes permanent, unless he dies, resigns, or is
removed following impeachment, he remains President, the Vice President
acts as President and there is no vice-presidential vacancy to be filled under
Section 2.279

274
275
276
277

278

279

issuing another recovery declaration, thereby activating the process again.”); Gustafson, supra note
166, at 468 (noting that a Congressional “finding of Section 4 inability is not necessarily permanent”
since the President may “appeal” such a declaration “an unlimited number of times.”); YALE LAW
SCHOOL RULE OF LAW CLINIC, supra note 8, at 70 (stating that President can repeat his “no
inability” declaration following adverse decision of Congress).
1965 House Hearings, supra note 110, at 94.
Id. at 101; see also id. at 101–02 (discussing Lindsay’s proposal which would allow Congress to later
restore power to the President).
Id. at 101 (stating his view, and establishing in colloquy with Katzenbach, that H.R.J. Res. 1 would
allow President to issue repeated “no inability” declarations).
Id. at 251; see also 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 106, at 45 (statement of Professor James C. Kirby,
Jr.) (distinguishing involuntary disability proceeding from impeachment partly because under the
latter the President can resume powers and duties of office).
See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, The 25th Amendment Option: Law and Politics, BALKINIZATION (Feb. 14, 2017,
5:02 PM), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2017/02/the-25th-amendment-option-law-and.html
(suggesting that use of Section 4 might lead to a vice-presidential vacancy while recognizing that
conclusion is not inevitable from the Amendment’s text).
See 1965 House Hearings, supra note 110, at 87 (statements of Sen. Birch Bayh and Rep. Richard H.
Poff) (stating that presidential inability provisions do not create vice-presidential vacancy); see also
FEERICK, supra note 10, at 109 (stating that legislative history makes clear that vice-presidential
vacancy does not arise when the Vice President acts as President under Section 3 or 4); YALE LAW
SCHOOL RULE OF LAW CLINIC, supra note 8, at 72 (“[T]he Vice President’s assumption of the
powers and duties as Acting President does not create such a ‘vacancy’ in the office of the Vice
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F. Can the President Reclaim Powers Immediately Upon His Declaration of Fitness?
One of the more troubling mistakes in the literature relates to the locus
of presidential power during the four-day period under Section 4 between
the time a President, who had previously had presidential powers transferred
from him under that Section due to his inability, declares his fitness and the
Vice President and Cabinet contest that declaration. Some, though
fortunately not many, recent writers have mistakenly concluded that the
President can resume power immediately upon transmitting his declaration.
The text of Section 4,280 its history, structure, and logic clearly provide that
the Vice President retains presidential power during this period (unless he
acquiesces in the President’s position).
Various scholarly treatments that have addressed the question have
concluded that the Vice President remains in power during the four-day
period unless he agrees that the President has regained his capacity.281 A few
writers of shorter pieces have, however, raised the possibility that the

280

281

President.”).
The text of Section 4 reads:
Whenever the Vice President and a majority of either the principal officers of the
executive departments or of such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit to
the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives
their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of
his office, the Vice President shall immediately assume the powers and duties of the office
as Acting President.
Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President pro tempore of the Senate
and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that no inability
exists, he shall resume the powers and duties of his office unless the Vice President and a
majority of either the principal officers of the executive department or of such other body
as Congress may by law provide, transmit within four days to the President pro tempore
of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration
that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office. Thereupon
Congress shall decide the issue, assembling within forty-eight hours for that purpose if not
in session. If the Congress, within twenty-one days after receipt of the latter written
declaration, or, if Congress is not in session, within twenty-one days after Congress is
required to assemble, determines by two-thirds vote of both Houses that the President is
unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice President shall continue
to discharge the same as Acting President; otherwise, the President shall resume the powers
and duties of his office.
U.S. CONST. amend XXV, § 4.
See, e.g., FEERICK, supra note 10, at 118–19 (explaining that the President must wait the full fourday period absent a conclusion by the Vice President and Cabinet to the contrary); BRIAN C. KALT,
CONSTITUTIONAL CLIFFHANGERS: A LEGAL GUIDE FOR PRESIDENTS AND THEIR ENEMIES 64,
82 (2012) (concluding that better legal arguments leave Vice President in power but denying that
President can resume power before four days expire even with the Vice President’s agreement);
Gustafson, supra note 166, at 468–69, 469 n.41 (noting that the Acting President can retain authority
for four days); YALE LAW SCHOOL RULE OF LAW CLINIC, supra note 8, at 8, 48–50 (concluding
that Congress always intended the Acting President retains authority during the four day period
although less conclusive regarding whether the President can return earlier with acquiescence).
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President could resume based simply on his declaration. Professor David
Faris reached that mistaken conclusion in August 2017. He imagined
that Pence became acting President under Section 4 only to have Trump
respond with a declaration of his fitness. At that point, Professor Faris
explained, “the president gets to be the president again (boo!)” unless Pence
and a Cabinet majority repeat their declaration that the President is unable
within four days in which case Pence is “once again” acting President subject
to Congress’s ultimate decision.282 Professor Faris claimed that the
Amendment created, rather than solved, “ambiguities and problems” since
Section 4 “could be interpreted” to allow the presidency to “change hands
four times in the span of a month. Who wrote this thing, anyway?”283 Professor
Faris repeatedly conveyed his understanding that the President would briefly
resume powers until the Vice President and Cabinet responded with a second
disability declaration. He so stated before the “boo!” comment. He stated
that upon reassertion of the Vice President and Cabinet majority of
presidential inability during the four-day period the Vice President is “once
again” acting president, signaling that he thinks the President’s assertion
temporarily displaced the Vice President. And the reference to “four”
changes in a month assumes that after the Vice President initially acts as
President (change 1) the President retakes power upon his declaration
(change 2) and then loses it again when the Vice President and Cabinet
contest his claim within four days (change 3) only to resume presidential
power based on favorable congressional action (change 4). In fact, power
changes at most twice since changes 2 and 3 do not occur.
Jon Meacham, the distinguished Pulitzer Prize winning biographer,
initially made the same mistake on January 11, 2018.284 In an otherwise
thoughtful piece in Time, he mistakenly wrote that after the Vice President
became acting President under Section 4, the President could “immediately
reassume office” upon sending the prescribed writing but that “the Vice
President again becomes acting President” if he and the Cabinet majority

282
283

284

David Faris, Opinion, Could the 25th Amendment Really Remove Trump from Office?, WEEK (Aug. 17, 2017),
http://theweek.com/articles/718950/could-25th-amendment-really-remove-trump-from-office.
Id.; see also Shear, supra note 62 (incorrectly suggesting that Trump would return to his duties upon
issuing a “no inability” letter but that Pence “would take over again” if Pence and the Cabinet
reasserted their view that the President was disabled). But see Prokop, supra note 267 (explaining
that the Vice President continues to hold presidential power during the four-day period for the Vice
President and Cabinet to contest the President’s declaration); Second Fordham University School
of Law Clinic on Presidential Succession, supra note 7, at 927–28 (explaining that the President does
not immediately resume power).
See Jon Meacham, Could the 25th Amendment Be Trump’s Downfall? Here’s How It Works, TIME (Jan. 11,
2018), available at https://perma.cc/PK7Z-QCPU.
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reassert their disagreement within four days.285 To his credit, Meacham
acknowledged and corrected the earlier error so the version that now
appears online accurately states that the Vice President continues to act
as President during the period Section 4 provides for him and the other
decision-makers to contest the President’s declaration. 286
Professor Brian Kalt, who has written extensively about this issue, agrees
that the Vice President remains in control during the four-day period. He
has, however, described the relevant portion of Section 4 as “poorly
drafted”287 and as “unclear”288 and has reported that commentators “have
frequently misread it” as authorizing the President to resume power pending
the Vice President/Cabinet response.289 Professor Kalt devoted a chapter in
his fine book, Constitutional Cliffhangers,290 to this misreading which he rejects
as “wrong.”291 Although Professor Kalt points out the portion of Section 4
could have been drafted better, he correctly concludes that the Vice
President retains power during the four-day period. Even though a few
learned people have misconstrued Section 4 after apparently focusing on the
most immediately relevant textual fragment, on further examination the

285
286

287

288
289

290
291

Id.
See Meacham, supra note 267 (acknowledging that the article initially had incorrectly characterized
Section 4 and explaining that Vice President remains as acting President under Section 4 during
the four day period “if sustained by a majority of the Cabinet (or the designated ‘other such body’)
as the matter moves to its congressional phase.”).
Brian C. Kalt, The Unusual, Imperfect, Excellent Twenty-fifth Amendment, CONST. CTR.,
https://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-constitution/amendments/amendment-xxv/theunusual-imperfect-excellent-twenty-fifth-amendment-by-brian-kalt/interp/42 (last visited Sept.
21, 2018).
KALT, supra note 281, at 63–64; see also id. at 67 (referring to the “poor drafting” of the four-day
provision as “serious”).
Brian Kalt, The Case Against Using the 25th Amendment to Get Rid of Trump, N.Y. MAG. (Oct. 14, 2017,
9:24
AM),
http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2017/10/the-case-against-using-25thamendment-to-get-rid-of-trump.html; see also Julia L. Ernst, John F. Kennedy and Constitutional Aspects
of Presidential Succession, 76 U. PITT. L. REV. 63, 82 n.116 (2014) (arguing that the Section 4 language
“contains sufficient ambiguity” that “a plausible argument” could be made that it supports the
conclusion that the President resumes power on his declaration); Michael Walsh, What Is the 25th
Amendment, and Could It Be Used to Remove Trump?, YAHOO NEWS (May 17, 2017),
https://www.yahoo.com/news/25th-amendment-used-remove-trump-215814401.html
(explaining that, according to Kalt’s reading of the Amendment, “if the president were to say he is
not disabled, he would not retake power immediately – because of the four-day waiting period”).
See generally KALT, supra note 281, at 61–82.
Kalt, supra note 289; see also KALT, supra note 281, at 64 (stating that evidence is “indisputable” that
architects of Section 4 intended the Vice President to exercise presidential powers during the four
day “waiting period” and finding “ample evidence that Section 4 so provides.”); id. at 66 (stating
that Section 4 creators intended the Vice President to continue to exercise presidential power) Kalt,
supra note 289 (arguing that “best reading” of text and “clear message” of the legislative history is
that Vice President retains power during the four-day period).
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issue does not really present a close call. The far better textual reading is that
the Vice President remains in power,292 and when Section 4 is read in context
and its full text is analyzed, when the record is considered for the light it sheds
on the original public meaning, understanding and intent, and when
structural arguments are considered, the only plausible reading is that the
Vice President continues to act as President until he relinquishes presidential
power to the President or Congress rules against him.
Start with the text. Section 4 provides that “when the President” using
proper procedures “transmits . . . his written declaration that no inability
exists, he shall resume the powers and duties of his office unless” the Vice
President and Cabinet contest it within four days.293 The language makes
the President’s resumption contingent upon the lack of a challenge within
four days. Those who infer that the President regains power at least
temporarily read the text to allow him to “resume . . . unless [and until]” the
Vice President and Cabinet majority dispute the President’s statement.294
But Section 4 does not provide that upon his “no inability” declaration the
President “shall resume” power “unless and until” the Vice President and
Cabinet contest his declaration.295 The omission of “until” is significant,
292

293
294
295

Cf. KALT, supra note 281, at 68 (concluding that a reading that leaves the Vice President in power
is more “natural” but an opposite reading is “possible.”); id. at 69 (concluding that the textual
argument that leaves the Vice President in power during the four-day period is stronger).
U.S. CONST. amend XXV, § 4.
KALT, supra note 281, at 68 (acknowledging that this conclusion rests on reading “unless” to mean
“unless and until” but viewing that reading as plausible but not most “natural” reading).
See also YALE LAW SCHOOL RULE OF LAW CLINIC, supra note 8, at 48–49 (describing the argument
as “tenuous” and pointing out that “unless” does not mean “‘unless and until’”). In canvassing the
possible arguments that a President might make that he immediately resumes power based on his
“no inability” declaration, Professor Kalt suggests that he might contend that if Section 4 meant
for the Vice President to continue acting as President during the four-day period the Amendment
should refer to him as the acting president since “every other time that the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment assigns the powers of the presidency to the vice president, it calls him the acting
president.” KALT, supra note 281, at 68. That argument is not persuasive. The Vice President
remains Vice President even when he is Acting President. Although the Amendment states that
when the President is declared disabled under Section 3 or 4, the Vice President performs as
“Acting President,” it consistently refers to him as “Vice President” throughout the Amendment
since that remains the office he fills. The Amendment never uses “Acting President” as a subject.
Moreover, in the use here in question, the Constitution is not “assign[ing]” presidential powers to
the Vice President because it has already done so for the period in question when he “immediately
assume[d]” those powers and duties. The term “Acting President” is used simply as a title with
respect to the Vice President’s discharge of presidential powers and duties. The power and duty to
determine, with the Cabinet (or “other body”), whether the President remains disabled
notwithstanding his “no inability” declaration is not a presidential power and duty since the
President can never exercise it. It is uniquely a vice-presidential power and duty that can be
exercised only in this situation by the Vice President during the four-day period. Finally, use of
“Acting President” might have introduced confusion since elsewhere the Constitution allows
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especially since the Amendment uses that very word in Section 3 to terminate
the Vice President’s service as acting President when the President transfers
power voluntarily.296 If the Amendment envisioned the President resuming
power immediately “until” being divested of that power by the Vice
President’s challenge, it would have so provided. It did not. The use simply
of “unless” signals that the President’s resumption depends on the
nonoccurrence of the condition and is accordingly deferred.
That conclusion is reinforced by the contrasting language Section 4 uses
in connection with the initial declaration by the Vice President and Cabinet
that the President is disabled as opposed to that following the President’s “no
inability” statement. The Vice President’s assumption of power occurs
“immediately” upon transmission of the required declaration of the
President’s inability.297 Conversely, the President’s resumption does not
happen “immediately.”298 It is contingent on the absence of an appropriate
challenge during the four-day period. If Section 4 envisioned the President
resuming presidential powers “immediately,” it would have so stated just as
it did in connection with the Vice President’s assumption under Section 4.
The omitted adverb signals that the President’s resumption is not immediate
but is contingent on the Vice President and Cabinet not challenging him
within four days.
The argument that the President resumes power immediately, yet
temporarily, encounters yet another textual problem. Section 4 states that
the Vice President “immediately” becomes acting President upon
transmitting the initial declaration and later it provides that he “shall
continue” in that role if (after an intra-executive branch dispute is presented
to Congress) each house votes that the President is disabled within twenty-

296

297

298

Congress to designate another “officer” to act as President in case of a double vacancy or inability
in the presidency or vice presidency, yet such an acting President is not intended to be a beneficiary
of, or participant in, Section 3 or 4.
See U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 3 (“Whenever the President transmits to the President pro
tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that
he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a written
declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice President as
Acting President.” (emphasis added)).
Id. § 4 (“Whenever the Vice President and a majority of either the principal officers of the executive
departments or of such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit to the President pro
tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration
that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice President shall
immediately assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting President.” (emphasis added)).
See also KALT, supra note 281, at 68–69 (observing the possibility that the failure of Section 4 to
provide that President “immediately” resumes exercise of presidential powers upon declaring her
fitness suggests that Vice President retains power).
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one days, or, alternatively, that the President “shall resume” presidential
powers if either house does not cast a two-thirds vote against the President
during the specified time period.299 If the Vice President is to “continue” if
Congress votes in his favor or the President is to “resume” if Congress does
not, the Vice President has to be acting as President during the roughly threeweek period Section 4 allows Congress to consider the issue. But between
the Vice President’s “immediate” assumption of presidential powers and
duties when he and the Cabinet majority first declare the President “unable”
and his later continuation (or the President’s resumption) after Congress
votes, Section 4 nowhere provides that the Vice President commences or
resumes acting as President. If the President’s “no disability” declaration
shifted power back to the President immediately, the Amendment would
need to return power to the Vice President before the twenty-one-day period
Congress has to decide so that the Vice President can “continue” if Congress
votes against the President or, so the President can “resume” if either house
supports her position. After all, a transfer of presidential power is a rather
consequential event and the Amendment does not leave such a transition to
inference. Yet, Section 4 nowhere provides for power to return to the Vice
President during that time period. That omission is no coincidence; it
confirms what is otherwise apparent, that the Vice President continues to act
as President during the four-day period. The Vice President has to continue
exercising presidential power during the four-day period or else he would not
be holding it during the twenty-one-day period as the language contemplates.
Finally, the existence of the twenty-one-day period for Congress to decide
further impeaches the interpretation that the President could return to power
immediately on his own “no inability” declaration. No one doubts that the
Vice President acts as President during the twenty-one-day period, a
conclusion cemented by the “continues” or “resume[s]” formulation. Yet,
only the most bizarre interpretation of Section 4 would make the President
wait for twenty-one days for Congress to decide whether he can “resume,”
but would allow him to “resume” immediately upon his mere declaration
and before an executive branch response is possible without an explicit
textual statement to that effect. Considering the entire clause, not just a
fragment, makes clear that unless the Vice President and Cabinet majority
fail to contest the President’s “no inability” declaration within the four day
period the Vice President continues to exercise presidential powers and
duties from the time he initially assumes them until Congress fails to sustain
his position within twenty-one days.
299

U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4.
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The legislative history provides even stronger evidence of the drafters’
intent, and of the understanding and public meaning of the provision.300
Indeed, it is so overwhelming that it leads inexorably to the conclusion that
the Vice President remains in power during the four-day period, and
accordingly it is recounted here more fully than it has previously been
presented.
To be sure, the original text of S.J. Res. 139 did a better job of conveying
that the President could not immediately resume presidential powers upon
his mere declaration. It used language largely taken from H.R.J. Res. 161
which a bipartisan group of legislators had introduced in 1958.301 It provided
that “Whenever the President makes public announcement in writing that
his inability has terminated, he shall resume the discharge of the powers and
duties of his office on the seventh day after making such announcement, or
at such earlier time after such announcement as he and the Vice President
may determine.”302 It further provided that if the Vice President, with the
concurrence of the majority of the heads of the executive departments “in
office at the time of such announcement [by the president],”303 transmitted
a declaration to Congress denying that the President’s inability had ended,
Congress would “consider the issue.”304 That formulation delayed the
President’s resumption for seven days absent the Vice President’s agreement
to an earlier return but it presented a different problem. As written, however,
if Congress took longer than seven days to resolve the intra-executive branch
dispute the President would return to power, thereby presenting the risk that
a disabled President might exercise presidential power.

300

301
302
303

304

See KALT, supra note 281, at 69 (concluding that legislative history makes it “abundantly clear” that
creators of Section 4 intended the Vice President to continue exercising presidential powers); id. at
70 (stating that intended meaning that the Vice President continue to exercise presidential powers
“was completely clear” to Bayh and to Congress.); id. at 71 (recognizing that the House “understood
completely” that the Vice President remained in power); id. (stating that as “evidence of legislative
intent goes,” evidence that Vice President remains in power during the four day period is “as clear
and definitive as it gets.”).
H.R.J. Res. 161, 85th Cong. (1958).
1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 106, at 11–12 (presenting text of original version of S.J. Res. 139,
section 5).
Professor Kalt suggests that this phrase would have prevented a President from “stacking the
cabinet.” KALT, supra note 281, at 69. Yet, the purpose of the limitation seems to have been to
prevent the Vice President from using Cabinet changes to entrench himself in power since he, not
the President, would have exercised presidential powers and duties during the seven-day waiting
period.
1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 106, at 11–12 (presenting text of original version of S.J. Res. 139,
section 5).
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The ABA consensus that developed in January 1964, the month after
Bayh introduced S.J. Res. 139, deviated from Bayh’s initial formulation in
some respects, including its rejection of the possibility that the President
could retake power after the waiting period if Congress had not acted.
During his February 25, 1964, testimony, Paul Freund, a member of the
ABA panel, stated that the Vice President would continue to serve as acting
President if the President and Vice President/Cabinet disagreed about his
fitness since “the office ought not to be at the hazard of an incapable
President.”305 John Feerick, another key member of the ABA group also
expressed this conclusion in his testimony three days later. He explained:
Fifth, the panel recommended that the President should be able to resume
his powers and duties upon his own declaration in writing. Because of the
possibility that a President might say he was able when he was not, it was the
panel’s consensus that the Vice President, subject to approval by a majority
of the Cabinet, should have the power to prevent him from acting in such a
case.
In a case where the Vice President and a majority of the Cabinet disagree
with the President’s declaration of recovery, review by Congress would be
required. The Vice President would continue to act in the interim, however.
It would take a two-thirds vote of both Houses of Congress to keep the
President from resuming his powers and duties.306

Eisenhower’s March 1964 letter to Bayh also assumed that the Vice President
would continue to act as President during any period when the President’s
capacity was disputed by the Vice President and the Cabinet.307
Those hearings produced an amended version of S.J. Res. 139 which
included language in its Section 5 which closely resembled that which was
later moved to the end of Section 4 in the ultimate Amendment. The major
differences pertinent here between the version of S.J. Res. 139 that passed
the Senate in September 1964 and the eventual Amendment were that the
S.J. Res. 139 version allowed the Vice President and Cabinet only two, rather
than four, days to contest the President’s declaration of fitness, and it
305
306

307

Id. at 130.
Id. at 152; see also Feerick, supra note 100, at 495 (“Because of the possibility that a President might
say he was able when he was not, it was the panel’s consensus that the Vice-President, subject to
approval by a majority of the Cabinet, should have the power to prevent him from acting in such a
case.”); John D. Feerick, Presidential Inability: The Problem and a Solution, 50 A.B.A. J. 321, 324 (1964)
(explaining that ABA consensus allowed the Vice President and Cabinet to “prevent” the President
from reclaiming power based simply on his declaration and the Vice President would continue to act
as President so the presidency “would not be filled by one whose capacity was seriously challenged.”).
See 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 106, at 232 (“Should there be any dispute between the President
and the Vice President as to whether the former is ready to resume his duties and the Cabinet
should agree with the Vice President, then the Vice President should continue to serve for the time
being.”).
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required Congress to “immediately decide” the dispute rather than impose a
twenty-one-day deadline. The new version of S.J. Res. 139 replaced the
original language that the President would “resume the discharge of the
powers and duties of his office on the seventh day” with the current “he shall
resume . . . unless” formulation and made clear that the Vice President, not
the President, would exercise presidential powers and duties during the
period in which Congress could decide in part by replacing the prior
language with the “Vice President shall continue” or the “President shall
resume” alternatives.308 In addition to following the ABA approach, the
drafters apparently sought concision309 for they worried about the length of
the Amendment.
The new language in S.J. Res. 139 was not intended to allow the
President to resume merely upon his statement. To the contrary, its apparent
purpose was to make sure that he could not retake presidential powers and
duties even during the longer period given Congress to act until it confirmed
his ability (unless the Vice President acquiesced). The Senate Report which
accompanied S.J. Res. 139 made clear that the President could resume
presidential power only after the process was completed in his favor, not
upon his declaration. Although it explained that Section 5 allowed the
President “to resume the powers and duties of the office” upon transmission
to Congress of the no inability declaration, it quickly stated that resumption
was subject to the Vice President and Cabinet sharing that conclusion.310 It
provided: “However, should the Vice President and a majority of the heads
of the executive departments feel that the President is unable, then they could
prevent the President from resuming the powers and duties of the office by
transmitting their written declaration so stating to the Congress within 2
days.”311 The use of “prevent,” a term from Feerick’s 1964 testimony,312
made clear that the President does not resume, but then lose, presidential
powers and duties during the two-day waiting period that version of S.J. Res.
139 allowed. The President does not resume at all during the period the Vice
President has to consider the issue. Instead, the Vice President continues to
act as President during the (then) two-day period. The report continued by
308
309

310
311
312

See S. REP. NO. 88-1382, at 2 (1964) (presenting amended version of S.J. Res. 139).
See, e.g., KALT, supra note 281, at 70 (attributing the editing to an effort “to make the amendment
more concise”); YALE LAW SCHOOL RULE OF LAW CLINIC, supra note 8, at 49 (concluding that
edits in the Senate version were intended to shorten the Amendment rather than alter its meaning).
S. REP. NO. 88-1382, at 12 (1964).
Id.
See 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 106, at 152 (“Because of the possibility that a President might
say he was able when he was not . . . the Vice President, subject to approval by a majority of the
Cabinet, should have the power to prevent him from acting in such a case.” (emphasis added)).
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using language that confirmed that the Vice President remained as acting
President during the congressional decision period.313
S.J. Res. 1, which Bayh introduced in January 1965, tracked the final
version of S.J. Res. 139 in this respect. In testimony on the constitutional
meaning of S.J. Res. 1 on January 29, 1965, Katzenbach stated his
understanding that its provisions contemplated that except where the
President had declared his own disability the Vice President would continue
acting as President notwithstanding the President’s “no inability”
declaration. Initially he stated his assumption that the Section 5 procedure
whereby the Vice President and Cabinet could challenge the President’s
resumption only applied when the President had been declared disabled
without his consent. When he had declared his own inability, “he could
restore himself immediately to the powers and duties” of the presidency by
his written statement to that effect.314 Katzenbach’s testimony rested on his
implicit understanding that the two-day waiting period of Section 5
precluded a president from resuming presidential powers “immediately.”
Katzenbach stated his further assumption “that even where disability was
established originally pursuant to section 4, the President could resume the
powers and duties of his Office immediately with the concurrence of the
Acting President, and would not be obliged to await the expiration of the
two-day period mentioned in section 5.”315 Katzenbach’s conclusion on that
point also showed his implicit understanding that unless the Vice President
was earlier convinced of the President’s fitness, the Vice President continued
as acting President during the (then) two-day period. Katzenbach referred
to the Vice President as acting President and said the Vice President
“presumably is continuing to act” until Congress decides.316 He said the
Amendment envisioned the Vice President continuing to act as President
until Congress declined to support him rather than allowing the President to
resume powers upon his declaration unless both the Cabinet majority and
two-thirds of Congress vote against him.317

313

314
315
316
317

S. REP. NO. 88-1382, at 12 (1964) (making clear that Vice President continues to act as President
during the period in which Congress considers an intra-executive branch dispute on the President’s
inability); see also 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 106, at 152 (testimony of John D. Feerick) (“In a
case where the Vice President and a majority of the Cabinet disagree with the President’s
declaration of recovery, review by Congress would be required. The Vice President would continue
to act in the interim, however.”)
1965 Senate Hearings, supra note 76, at 10.
Id.; see also 1965 House Hearings, supra note 110, at 99, 107 (statement of Att’y Gen. Nicholas
Katzenbach).
1965 Senate Hearings, supra note 76, at 16.
Id. at 17.
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In discussion with Katzenbach during the Senate hearings, Bayh
explained that the Amendment was striving to achieve two things—to
prevent a disabled President from acting as President for even a short time
and to keep the process as simple as possible.318 Bayh thought to minimize
transfers it was better not to allow the President to resume power upon his
simple declaration in a situation where a challenge might occur.319
Feerick was troubled that the language in Section 5 of H.R.J. Res. 1 was
not sufficiently “clear” regarding who exercised presidential powers during
the period between the President’s “no inability” declaration and the Vice
President’s communication of his disagreement. In a letter of February 7,
1965, to Representative Richard Poff on the eve of the House Judiciary
Committee hearings, Feerick raised this issue. He wrote that “[t]he VicePresident is intended to act in the period, I am sure, but it can be forceably
[sic] argued that the language does not and will not permit him to do so.”320
Since Section 5 addressed “an extraordinary case such as that of an insane
President” Feerick thought clarification desirable to preclude such a disabled
President from reclaiming presidential powers and firing Cabinet members
to avert use of the provision.321 As a scholar of presidential inability, Feerick
raised this issue out of an abundance of caution “because I am only too
mindful of what the words ‘the same’ did”322 in creating a problem that the
proposed Amendment was, in part, designed to resolve.
The process of writing an illuminating legislative history had only just
begun, and what followed made clear the widespread intent and
understanding that under the proposal the Vice President remained in power
during the waiting period. In issuing the Report which accompanied S.J.
Res. 1 on February 10, 1965, the Senate Committee on the Judiciary went
out of its way to address the circumstances in which the President could
reclaim his or her power323 and to clarify that when presidential powers and
duties were transferred to the Vice President under Sections 4 and 5 of S.J.
318
319
320

321
322
323

Id.
Id. at 17–18.
Letter from John D. Feerick to Hon. Richard Poff, U.S. House of Representatives (Feb. 7, 1965)
(on file with the Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History), available at
https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1031&context=twentyfifth_amendm
ent_correspondence.
Id.
Id.
See S. REP. NO. 89-66, at 3 (1965) (“In its discussion of the ramifications of section 5, the committee
considered it important to add additional stress to the interpretation of two questions which might
arise: (1) Who has the powers and duties of the office of the President while the provisions of section
5 are being implemented? (2) Under what sense of urgency is Congress required to act in carrying
out provisions of this section?”).
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Res. 1, the Vice President retained power until Congress decided in the
President’s favor. Addressing the point which Katzenbach had suggested in
his recent testimony, the Report distinguished the provisions regarding
presidential resumption of power depending on whether the initial transfer
occurred under Section 3 or 4. A President who transferred power under
Section 3 could immediately reclaim powers by simple declaration in part to
encourage such voluntary transfers where appropriate.324 Yet, when power
was transferred under Sections 4 and 5, the Vice President would continue
to act as President until Congress decided adversely to him.325 Although the
President could resume his powers if the Vice President and Cabinet majority
agreed that he had regained capacity, the Report made it clear that this
group could “prevent the President from resuming” those powers if they
objected within two days.326
When Bayh testified before the House Judiciary Committee on February
9, 1965, he stated that Section 5 of S.J. Res. 1 allowed the Vice President to
divest himself of presidential powers immediately but that he would
otherwise continue to act as President during the two-day period allowed for
a challenge.327 Bayh stated that under Section 5, notwithstanding a
presidential “no inability” declaration, “[t]he Vice President continues to act
as President until the Congress decides the issue. We have given this a
considerable amount of study and we have tried to arrive at a situation where
there is a minimum amount of change back and forth.”328
324

325

326

327

328

Id. (“Under the terms of section 3 a President who voluntarily transfers his powers and duties to the
Vice President may resume these powers and duties by making a written declaration of his ability
to perform the powers and duties of his office and transmitting such declaration to the President of
the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives. This will reduce the reluctance of the
President to utilize the provisions of this section in the event he fears it would be difficult for him to
regain his powers and duties once he has voluntarily relinquished them.”).
Id. (“However, the intent of section 5 is that the Vice President is to continue to exercise the powers
and duties of the office of Acting President until a determination on the President’s inability is made
by Congress. It is also the intention of the committee that the Congress should act swiftly in making
this determination, but with sufficient opportunity to gather whatever evidence it determined
necessary to make such a final determination.”).
Id. at 14 (“Section 5 of the proposed amendment would permit the President to resume the powers
and duties of the office upon his transmission to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the
House of Representatives of his written declaration that no inability existed. However, should the
Vice President and a majority of the principal officers of the executive departments feel that the
President is unable, then they could prevent the President from resuming the powers and duties of
the office by transmitting their written declaration so stating to the President of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives within 2 days.”).
See 1965 House Hearings, supra note 110, at 41 (“[T]he Vice President—if he has the support of a
majority of the Cabinet—could retain the powers and duties for 2 days following the President’s
declaration.”).
Id. at 58; see also id. at 63 (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh) (stating that Vice President “can continue
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When the Senate debated the proposal ten days later, the Republican
leader, Senator Everett Dirksen, questioned whether Section 5 of S.J. Res. 1
would force the President to wait two days before recovering presidential
powers “even though he had voluntarily relinquished it[.]”329 Significantly,
Dirksen understood that under S.J. Res. 1 the Vice President normally
retained power during the challenge period but thought that practice should
not apply when the President voluntarily made the disability decision under
Section 3. Bayh assured him that under Section 3 the President could
reassume presidential powers by his declaration, implicitly distinguishing it
from a Section 4 situation.330
When Senator Frank Lausche asked whether, after the President’s
incapacity had been declared by the Vice President and Cabinet, the
President would remain in office pending a determination by the Vice
President, Cabinet, and Congress, Bayh replied that he would not, but that,
on the contrary, “whenever” the Vice President and Cabinet majority
declare the president disabled, “the Vice President would assume the powers
and duties of the office while the issue was being tried.”331 Bayh explained
that the Amendment sought “to try to prevent a back-and-forth ping-pong
sort of situation.”332 The proposal would limit the number of transfers and
promote continuity which “should be basic.”333
During Senate debate on February 19, 1965, Bayh accepted Hruska’s
amendment to extend from two to seven days the period the Vice President
and Cabinet had to contest the President’s “no inability” declaration. When
Senator Gordon Allott asked who would act as President during the sevenday period, Bayh replied “The Vice President, the Acting President.”334
Bayh explained that whenever the Vice President and Cabinet declared the
President disabled, there would be sufficient question about the President’s
mental capacity so that the Vice President should continue acting until
Congress decided.335 Moreover, leaving the Vice President as acting
President would reduce the number of transfers of presidential power.336 If
the President issued a “no inability” declaration, he could not resume office

329
330
331
332
333
334
335
336

to act beyond a reasonable period” only with support of two-thirds of Congress); id. at 69 (imagining
a hypothetical premised on Vice President acting through entire challenge and decision time).
111 CONG. REC. 3268 (1965).
Id. at 3271.
Id. at 3284.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 3285.
Id.
Id.
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until the expiration of the time for the Vice President and Cabinet to contest
that declaration, then seven days,337 unless the Vice President and President
agreed to a quicker return.338
In House hearings, in addition to Bayh’s testimony described above, other
principal architects of the measure also confirmed the understanding that the
Vice President remained in power during the period permitted him to
challenge the President’s “no inability” declaration. Katzenbach reiterated
that S.J. Res 1 and H.R.J. Res. 1 left the Vice President as acting President
after the President issued a “no inability” declaration unless either the Vice
President agreed with his position or two days expired without the Vice
President and Cabinet challenging the President’s position.339 He understood
Section 5, which then gave the Vice President two days to contest the
President’s “no inability” declaration, as imposing “a 48-hour, in effect,
delay” during which the Vice President continued to act as President.340 So
did former Attorney General Brownell. When Representative John V.
Lindsay asked Brownell why H.R.J. Res. 1 provided that once the Vice
President took over as acting President he would remain so until Congress
reversed him,341 Brownell stated that he preferred the H.R.J. Res. 1 approach
because it left the Vice President as acting President for the “very brief period”
until there was an independent determination that “the President was able to
come back . . . .”342 Brownell also thought leaving the Vice President in
power would minimize “jumping back and forth.”343 Brownell’s testimony
confirmed his (and Lindsay’s) understanding that the Vice President remained
in power as well as repeated the logic Bayh had earlier given.
The report of the House Judiciary Committee on H.R.J. Res. 1 on March
24, 1965, expressed a consistent interpretation. In explaining revisions made
following hearings, the report provided in part that when the President
transferred power voluntarily under Section 3, his “no inability” declaration
terminated the vice president’s exercise of presidential powers. “The right of
challenge would be reserved for cases” when the Vice President assumed
337
338
339

340
341
342

343

Id.
Id.
1965 House Hearings, supra note 110, at 99–100; see also id. at 107 (stating that with the concurrence
of the Vice President, the President could resume presidential powers during the two-day period
provided under Section 5 of H.R.J. Res. 1)
Id. at 99.
Id. at 248, 250.
Id. at 250; see also id. at 243 (statement of former Att’y Gen. Herbert Brownell) (stating that the Vice
President would remain in power during the two-day period unless he agreed to an earlier
resumption of power by the President).
Id. at 252.
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power under Section 4.344 The House combined former Section 5 with
Section 4 to emphasize that the “challenge” procedure only applied to
Section 4.345 The committee understood that the Vice President’s right to
contest the President’s “no inability” declaration carried with it the right to
remain in office during the period in which the contest could be raised and,
if it were, during the subsequent decision period.346
The House Judiciary Committee had provided that the Vice President
and Cabinet majority must lodge a challenge to the President’s declaration of
his ability within two days and added a ten-day period for Congress to decide
any intra-executive branch dispute. “Otherwise,” it said, “the President,
having declared himself able, will resume his powers and duties.”347 The use
of “[o]therwise” made clear that the President did not resume based upon his
mere declaration but had to wait to see whether his executive branch
associates challenged him and, if they did, whether Congress ruled in his favor
or the ten days passed with no ruling adverse to him. In explaining the
operation of Section 4 once the Vice President and Cabinet majority
challenged the President’s statement, the Report stated that:
[T]he language of former Section 5 is further amended by providing that in
such event the President shall resume the powers and duties of his office
unless the Congress within 10 days after receipt of such declaration of
Presidential inability determines by two-thirds vote of both Houses that the
President is in fact unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office.348

It is telling that the Report used virtually the same formulation (“shall
resume . . . unless”) as the Amendment used regarding the earlier intraexecutive branch contest period. It was understood that the Vice President
would act as President during the ten-day period for Congress to decide, and
the use of the same formulation signaled that he would also act under the
contest period in H.R.J. Res. 1.
During the floor debates in the House, various architects of the
Amendment made clear that the Vice President acted as President during
the decision period.349 When Celler was specifically asked who would
344

345
346
347
348
349

H.R. REP. NO. 89-203, at 2 (1965); see id. at 3 (explaining that the committee intended “that the
procedure provided by [Section 4] relate[ ] only to cases in which Presidential inability has been
declared by others than the President.”).
Id. at 2–3.
Id.
Id. at 3.
Id.
See 111 CONG. REC. 7938 (1965) (statement of Rep. Emanuel Celler) (“In other words, if there is a
dispute, as I stated, in the interest of continuity of executive power and stability, the Vice President
takes over and remains in the office as Acting President until Congress acts. . . . Thus we escape the
danger of a disabled President carrying on for even a short while.”).
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discharge presidential powers and duties during the period when the Vice
President and Cabinet were deciding whether to contest the President’s no
inability claim, he stated that the Vice President would continue to serve as
acting President during this period and quoted Katzenbach to that effect.350
When pressed, Celler said that the Vice President as acting President would
“be in the saddle unless he agrees the President is fully restored.”351
Representative Robert Duncan, Celler’s interlocutor, confirmed the
substance of their exchange when he summarized that unless the Vice
President acquiesced in the President’s no inability claim, the Vice President
“would continue as Acting President during all intervals of time necessary for
the Cabinet and the President to transmit their letter and the Congress to
take such action as may be necessary.”352
Lindsay, a member of the House Judiciary Committee, stated his
understanding that the Vice President retained power until Congress decided
adverse to his position. Lindsay recognized that “that word ‘unless’ is the
key. It is very significant.”353 He disclosed that in committee deliberations
he preferred a formulation that would have allowed the President to hold
power unless Congress reversed him by a two-thirds vote but that H.R.J. Res.
1 “provides just the reverse, that the Vice President, on his declaration,
backed by a majority of the Cabinet, retain power unless he is reversed by
the Congress.”354 Lindsay had offered an amendment in committee to flip
the procedure but was defeated.355 Representative Arch Moore of the House
Judiciary Committee also understood that Section 4 allowed the Vice
President to remain in power until Congress ruled against him, a resolution
he opposed.356 Moore thought that the President should be able “to simply
state he is capable of reassuming his office” and “that he shall then reassume”
presidential powers.357
Moore, in fact, offered a floor amendment to change Section 4 to provide
that the President would immediately resume presidential powers and duties
upon issuing his “no inability” declaration. The Vice President and Cabinet
350
351
352

353
354
355
356
357

Id. at 7939.
Id.
Id. at 7939–40; see also id. at 7941–42 (statement of Rep. Richard H. Poff) (explaining that the initial
declaration by the Vice President and Cabinet shifts powers to the Vice President with the
President’s remedy being to seek Congressional review to restore him).
Id. at 7948.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 7949.
Id.; see also id. at 7956 (statement of Rep. William J. Randall) (stating that Section 4 prevented two
people from simultaneously asserting presidential powers); id. at 7958–59 (statement of Rep.
Rodney M. Love) (arguing that Section 4 as revised deferred President’s resumption of powers until
after Vice President and Cabinet failed to respond).
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could contest the President’s declaration, and Congress would resolve it, but
during those time periods, the President, not the Vice President, would
discharge presidential powers, under Moore’s proposal.
Moore, of course, would not have offered this proposal unless he
understood that Section 4 allowed the Vice President to act as President
notwithstanding the President’s “no inability” assertion. Not a single
representative contradicted Moore’s understanding of Section 4 during the
debate on his proposal. Some reiterated the acknowledged interpretation
that the Vice President retained presidential powers during the period in
which the Vice President and Cabinet could decide whether or not to
challenge the President’s “no inability” declaration and during the period
Congress took to decide, and beyond if Congress ruled against the
President.358 Moore’s motion was defeated, 58 to 122.359
Representative James Corman explained the reasoning behind H.R.J.
Res. 1’s approach of deferring presidential resumption of powers. It would
guard against the risk that the President’s “no inability” declaration was
unfounded and that the President was, in fact, mentally unsound.360 It would
prevent a situation in which there was uncertainty as to who was entitled to
discharge presidential powers.361 It would obviate the danger that the
President, having resumed power, could discharge Cabinet members and
accordingly prevent further action by Congress to determine whether the
President was disabled.362 Finally, the framers wanted to reduce the transfers
of presidential powers. By allowing the Vice President to continue to act,
they minimized the number of such transfers.363
The Conference Committee chose a four-day period as a compromise
between the two-day period in the House version and the seven-day period
in the Senate version. Poff, too, stated during the final House debate that
the four-day period was “an outside limitation” and that “it is not necessary
that the President wait 4 days to resume his office if he and the Vice President
mutually agree that he do so earlier.”364 Implicit in Poff’s statement was the
358

359
360

361
362
363
364

See, e.g., id. at 7965 (statement of Rep. James C. Corman) (“[W]hen we get into a dispute between
the President . . . and the Vice President and the Cabinet . . . the Vice President will retain power
for 2 days. If the dispute continues beyond 2 days, Congress must act within 10 days.”).
Id. at 7966.
Id. at 7965; see also id. (statement of Rep. Emanuel Celler) (opposing Moore’s amendment because
it might allow a President who was “nutty as a fruitcake” or “utterly insane” to resume presidential
powers during the two-day period).
Id. (statement of Rep. James C. Corman).
Id. (statements of Rep. Peter W. Rodino, Jr. and Rep. James C. Corman).
Id. at 7966 (statement of Rep. Robert McClory).
Id. at 15,214 (statement of Rep. Richard H. Poff).
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understanding that absent a vice-presidential agreement, the Vice President
continues to act as President during the four-day period.
When Bayh presented the Conference Report to the Senate, he noted
that it changed the proposed Amendment from that the Senate approved
earlier that year by making specific that a President who declared his inability
voluntarily under Section 3 could reclaim powers by a simple declaration.365
The absence of any similar comment regarding an involuntary transfer under
Section 4 signaled that no such resumption accompanied a simple “no
inability” declaration in that context. Significantly, Bayh twice described the
four-day period in which the Vice President and Cabinet could contest a
presidential “no inability” declaration as a “waiting period” before the
President could resume presidential powers and duties.366
Feerick articulated the same understanding in two articles that were
widely circulated during the ratification period. In the A.B.A. Journal, he
wrote that if the President, having been declared disabled under Section 4,
announced his recovery, “he then would have to wait four days before he
could resume his powers and duties” while the Vice President and Cabinet
assessed the situation.367 He might assume his powers and duties before the
four days ended if the Vice President and Cabinet agreed.368 Feerick
explained that the Vice President would continue to act as President during
any period in which the President’s ability was challenged “so that the powers
and duties of President would never be in the hands of a person whose
capacity had been seriously challenged.”369 In a December 1965 law review
article, Feerick wrote that “the President could announce his own recovery
but he would then have to wait four days before resuming his powers and
duties.”370 Unless the Vice President and Cabinet agreed to the President’s
earlier resumption,371 “[t]he Vice-President would continue to act as
President, pending the decision of Congress, so that the powers and duties of
President would never be in the hands of a person whose capacity had been
seriously challenged,” Feerick explained.372
In addition to the textual arguments, the legislative history confirms in
overwhelming fashion that the Vice President possesses presidential powers
365
366
367
368
369
370
371
372

Id. at 15,378.
Id.
Feerick, supra note 203, at 917.
Id.
Id.
Feerick, supra note 124, at 200.
Id. at 200–01.
Id. at 201; see also American Bar Association & John D. Feerick, supra note 203, at 4 (explaining that
under Section 4 President resumes powers only if his declaration is not contested in four days by
the Vice President and majority of the Cabinet).
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and duties during the four-day period. Committee reports expressed that
intent as did statements by the chief proponents of the measure in both the
Senate (Bayh) and the House (Celler), a past (Brownell) and current
(Katzenbach) attorney general to whom legislators looked for legal guidance,
and key witnesses (Eisenhower, Freund, Feerick), as well as others. The
legislative history also illuminates that the provision was understood in a
manner consistent with the intent and provides evidence regarding the
meaning a reasonable person in the mid-1960s would have given the words.
In addition to the evidence recounted above, no one suggested during
legislative discussions that the provision allowed the President to return to
power immediately upon his mere “no inability” declaration alone rather
than await the response of the Vice President and Cabinet.373 On the
contrary, two proponents of immediate presidential resumption (Moore and
Lindsay) complained that H.R.J. Res. 1 made the President wait and sought
at different junctures, unsuccessfully, to amend the proposal. The record and
various articles explaining that the Vice President remained in power were
widely circulated during the ratification period.
The legislative record also articulated the structural considerations that
informed the decision to make the President wait before resuming power.
The presidential inability provisions reflect an interest in having a
functioning person discharging presidential powers at all times. Until an
authoritative decision-maker (like the Vice President, Cabinet, or Congress)
blessed the President’s return, the safest course and the one consistent with
that objective required the Vice President to continue. Moreover, an interest
in stability argued for minimizing change. Bayh later wrote that the
committee had considered the “touchy” issue of whether the President or
Vice President would discharge presidential powers during a period in which
the President’s capacity was unresolved. Bayh and the committee had
concluded that “from the time the Vice President assumed the powers and
duties of the President until Congress decided the issue, the Vice President
should continue to act.”374 That resolution would minimize uncertainty
regarding the locus of presidential power and ensure that “a President gone
berserk could not reclaim his powers and duties even for a few hours, thus
doing irreparable damage before Congress was able to decide on his
373

374

Questions to Bayh, Celler, or other Amendment architects during legislative hearings and debates
regarding the meaning of Section 4 cannot, of course, be taken as indicating ambiguity or confusion
unless the questioner so states since often such questions are designed to make legislative history, to
educate the questioner or others regarding the operation of a provision, to set a foundation for
further discussion of a topic, or simply to restate what is already clear.
BAYH, supra note 94, at 272–73.
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inability.”375 Bayh’s statement demonstrated the compelling logic behind
making the President wait until some authoritative voice confirmed his
capacity, and that logic was consistent with the better reading of the text and
the legislative history.
Finally, leaving the Vice President in power accords with common sense,
which is not simply a guide to living but an instrument of constitutional
interpretation. So Chief Justice John Marshall taught nearly two centuries
ago in McCulloch v. Maryland.376 Marshall reasoned that absent a clear
constitutional statement to the contrary, the Constitution should be
interpreted reasonably in a manner to facilitate, not to frustrate, the
realization of its purposes.377
The interpretation that would allow the President to resume immediately
invites the following nightmarish hypothetical situation which would
frustrate the entire purpose of Section 4. Imagine that a moment after the
Vice President and Cabinet act under Section 4 to transfer presidential
powers and duties from a deranged and delusional President, that same
apparently compromised President resumes power by transmitting his simple
declaration. Possessed again with presidential powers and duties absent any
meaningful check, he fires the Cabinet, evicts the Vice President from the
West Wing of the White House, and orders American troops to attack Great
Britain and Canada. The absurdity of this situation on several levels
impeaches the interpretation that would allow the President to resume
immediately on his own determination. Not only would it return to power a
President just declared deranged, it would allow him to circumvent the very
checks Section 4 imposes against a President who seeks to reclaim power
while disabled, namely the review of the Vice President and Cabinet and
two-thirds of each house of Congress, the ultimate check. Absent
unequivocal constitutional language mandating that the President could
return with no review, McCulloch teaches that the Constitution should always
favor a result that would advance, not destroy, its purposes.

375
376
377

Id. at 273.
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
See id. at 408–09 (“Can we adopt that construction, (unless the words imperiously require it,) which
would impute to the framers of that instrument, when granting these powers for the public good,
the intention of impeding their exercise by withholding a choice of means? If, indeed, such be the
mandate of the constitution, we have only to obey; but that instrument does not profess to
enumerate the means by which the powers it confers may be executed; nor does it prohibit the
creation of a corporation, if the existence of such a being be essential to the beneficial exercise of
those powers.”); id. at 415 (“It must have been the intention of those who gave these powers, to
insure, as far as human prudence could insure, their beneficial execution.”).
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On at least two occasions, the Department of Justice378 has issued
opinions that confirm that the Vice President remains in power during the
four-day period. A few days after the attempt to assassinate President
Reagan, Theodore Olson, Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal
Counsel, issued a memorandum for the Attorney General in which he
referred to Section 4’s “mechanism” which allowed the Vice President,
Cabinet, and Congress “to override the President” in resuming the powers
and duties of his office.379 “Under Section 4, the Vice President remains
Acting President until the issue is resolved,” Olson wrote.380 Four years later,
after describing Section 4, an OLC opinion stated that the President could
resume his powers and duties upon his declaration “unless, within four days”
the Vice President and Cabinet contest his declaration, thereby requiring
Congress to resolve the issue.381 “The Vice President would remain Acting
President until the congressional vote.”382
After this article was largely complete, a copy of the “Contingency Plans”
issued early during the Administration of William J. Clinton was made
available.383 The Plan, which appears largely to have been prepared during
the Reagan years and forwarded onward to subsequent administrations,384
concludes that “the more persuasive legal arguments would leave authority
in the Vice President until the four-day period had elapsed” although it
prefaces that conclusion by terming it “uncertain” regarding who governs
during the four-day period.385 Some of the uncertainty the Plan finds seems
378
379

380
381
382
383

384

385

See KALT, supra note 281, at 81 (suggesting that the Office of Legal Counsel of the justice department
could help settle the issue with a public opinion confirming that the Vice President remains in power).
Memorandum from Theodore C. Olson, Assistant Att’y Gen., to the Att’y Gen. 2 (Apr. 3, 1981)
(on file with the Office of Legal Counsel), available at https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/sites/default/
files/digitallibrary/whormsubject/fg017/40-654-198419-fg017-177000-180999-2017.pdf.
Id.
Operation of the Twenty-fifth Amendment Respecting Presidential Succession, supra note 180, at 67.
Id.
OFFICE OF THE COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT, CONTINGENCY PLANS—DEATH OR DISABILITY
OF THE PRESIDENT (Mar. 16, 1993) [hereinafter CONTINGENCY PLANS], available at
https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1009&context=twentyfifth_amendme
nt_executive_materials. Thanks to Reb Brownell and John Rogan for obtaining this document and
making it available. See also KALT, supra note 281, at 81 (suggesting the Contingency Plan could
clarify the situation by stating that the Vice President continues in power during the four-day period).
See Fred F. Fielding, Fordham Law Review Symposium Keynote Address, An Eyewitness Account of
Executive “Inability,” 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 823, 828–29 (2010) (describing Fielding’s work preparing
the Contingency Plan during the Reagan administration and reporting his finding the Plan was still
in use during the George W. Bush administration when he returned as White House counsel late
in the second term).
See Temporary Disability of the President: Threshold Considerations, at 3, in CONTINGENCY PLANS (outlining
procedures for temporarily transferring power from the President to Vice President when the
President is unable to exercise the powers and duties of office).
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to relate to whether the President could resume during the four-day period
even if the Vice President and Cabinet indicated they did not contest the
President’s “no inability” declaration.386 Memoranda from the Ford and
Carter Administrations support the conclusion that the Vice President
remains in power during the four-day period but find some uncertainty.387
These executive branch documents tend to provide support for the
proposition asserted here that the Vice President remains in power during
the four-day period although stronger statements would be helpful and
merited. The Plan and some of the underlying documents are often
conclusory and do not consider all of the pertinent arguments or evidence.
Although the text, legislative record, and structural arguments make clear
that the President does not resume power simply based on his “no inability”
declaration, the President might resume before the four-day period is exhausted
with, and only with, the appropriate acquiescence from the relevant executive
branch officials. The legislative history is overwhelming on this point388 and the
386

387

388

See, e.g., Temporary Disability of the President: Resumption of Authority by the President, at 3–4, in
CONTINGENCY PLANS ( stating that even without considering a disagreement situation between the
President, the Vice President/Cabinet majority as to the President’s ability to govern, “the question
remains as to who governs during the four-day period following the President’s declaration that he
again is able to perform the duties of his office,” and focusing its discussion on whether the President
could resume during the four day period with the acquiescence of the Vice President/Cabinet).
See, e.g., 25th Amendment, August 21, 1975, at 5, in CONTINGENCY PLANS (concluding that “[t]he
legislative history . . . indicates” the Vice President exercises presidential powers during four-day
period but foresees “a feeling of serious uncertainty” which could be “debilitating”); Memorandum from
Frank Wiggins to Mike Berman, at 4, in CONTINGENCY PLANS (stating that he was “fairly confident” a
court would conclude that the Vice President remained in power during four-day period after having
acknowledged some “uncertainty”). The uncertainties in the 1975 document relate to the national
mood given the unique circumstances, not the legal analysis, and would be inherent in the situation.
Those in the Wiggins memorandum seem to rest on some misreading of the legislative record. The
author also states that his review of the congressional history was not “exhaustive.” Id. at n.2. A
third memorandum from a political aide to Vice President Walter F. Mondale does not address the
four-day issue but contains other mistakes. Memorandum from Robert Torricelli to Michael Berman, March
21, 1978, in CONTINGENCY PLANS. I plan to discuss the Contingency Plan and some of the flaws in
it and in the analysis of this and other points in a subsequent article.
See, e.g., 1965 Senate Hearings, supra note 76, at 10 (statement of Acting Att’y Gen. Nicholas
Katzenbach) (stating assumption that President could resume presidential powers immediately with
concurrence of Vice President); 1965 House Hearings, supra note 110, at 99–100, 107 (statement of
Att’y Gen. Nicholas Katzenbach) (reiterating assumption that President could immediately resume
powers if Vice President agrees); id. at 243 (statement of former Att’y Gen. Herbert Brownell)
(stating that President and Vice President could agree to the President resuming power before the
waiting period expires); 111 CONG. REC. 3285 (1965) (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh) (stating that
President and Vice President could agree to a shorter period of time); id. at 7939–40 (statement of
Rep. Emanuel Celler) (explaining that the Vice President could agree that the President is no longer
disabled and that therefore the President may resume his powers); id. (statement of Rep. Robert B.
Duncan) (confirming, in exchange with Rep. Celler, that the Vice President could allow the
President to resume the powers of his office); id. at 15,214 (statement of Rep. Richard H. Poff) (“[I]t
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logic of this conclusion is compelling.389 Section 4 prevents a previouslydeclared disabled President from resuming power for four days, to allow the
Vice President and Cabinet an opportunity to respond so as to preclude
frustration of the Section 4 process and to minimize transfers. These purposes
do not apply once an authoritative determination independent of the President
finds the President is fit to return to power. The legislative history makes clear
that the President does not have to wait the entire twenty-one-day period if
Congress makes an earlier decision in his favor.390 That analogy would also
support allowing the President to resume during the four-day period with the
appropriate acquiescence from the appropriate executive branch officials.
There is some uncertainty as to whether both the Vice President and
Cabinet must agree with the President’s “no inability” declaration in order
for the President to resume before the four days expire, or whether a decision
by either the Vice President or the Cabinet majority to that effect would
suffice. Most of the comments in the legislative history suggested that the
Vice President’s determination alone would be sufficient.391 Some of John
Feerick’s writings at the time suggested that the President might resume
earlier if she, the Vice President and Cabinet all agreed,392 although he did
not discuss whether such an earlier presidential resumption might occur
based on action by just the Vice President or Cabinet majority. Feerick’s
classic book on the subject states that “Either the Vice President alone or the
Cabinet and Vice President can agree to the President’s taking over

389

390

391
392

is not necessary that the President wait 4 days to resume his office if he and the Vice President
mutually agree that he do so earlier.”); see also Feerick, supra note 124, at 200 (stating that President
could resume before the four-day period upon agreement of President, Vice President and Cabinet);
Feerick, supra note 203, at 917 (“[I]f [the Vice President and Cabinet] agreed with the President,
the President would assume his powers and duties at the end of four days, or earlier if all agreed.”);
Gustafson, supra note 166, at 469 n.41, 475 (stating that Vice President could return power during
the four-day period to the President).
But see KALT, supra note 281, at 73 (arguing that allowing the President to resume powers and duties
before the four-day period ends is “inconsistent with the whole idea of the mandatory waiting
period.”).
See H.R. REP. NO. 89-564 at 4 (1965) (“A vote of less than two-thirds by either House would
immediately authorize the President to assume the powers and duties of his office.”); 111 CONG.
REC. 15,379 (1965) (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh) (explaining that “[t]he 21 days need not always
be used” and that earlier action in favor of the President would restore him to power immediately);
see also FEERICK, supra note 10, at 120 (describing the twenty-one day limit as “an outside limitation”
and identifying the Amendment’s intent as calling for as prompt action as possible with
understanding that President would resume immediately upon action in his favor).
See supra note 388.
See e.g., Feerick, supra note 124, at 200 (stating that President could resume before the four-day
period upon agreement of the President, Vice President and Cabinet); Feerick, supra note 203, at
917 (“[I]f [the Vice President and Cabinet] agreed with the President, the President would assume
his powers and duties at the end of four days, or earlier if all agreed.”).
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immediately or at any time short of four days.”393 The legislative history
specifically recognizes that a vote by either the House of Representatives or
Senate in support of the President’s position before the twenty-one days
expire would result in the President’s immediate resumption.394 That
analogy might suggest that if either the Vice President or a Cabinet majority
acquiesced in the President’s “no inability” determination during the four
days he would resume power. The Amendment does not state how the
acquiescence of the Vice President and/or the Cabinet might be shown, but
the use of public letters to the President pro tempore of the Senate and
Speaker of the House of Representatives for other Section 4 communications
implies that this vehicle would also be appropriate for this application.
Although the legislative record, structural considerations, and logic
dictate that the President could resume before the four-day period elapsed
with appropriate independent consent, the precise content of the necessary
acquiescence is admittedly less certain. Clearly acquiescence of both the
Vice President and Cabinet majority would be sufficient and the legislative
history overwhelmingly suggests that the Vice President’s agreement alone
would suffice. The twenty-one-day analogy suggests that Cabinet agreement
alone would also work. Fortunately, this area involves an extremely remote
contingency—a disagreement between the Vice President and the Cabinet
regarding whether the President is able to resume after they had previously
determined her to be unable.
The text, legislative record, and structural considerations leave no
ambiguity that the Vice President continues to act as President a) during the
four-day period allowed for the Vice President and Cabinet to respond to the
President’s “no disability” declaration and, if they reassert their view that he
is disabled, b) during the twenty-one-day period allowed for Congress to
decide unless one house decides against the Vice President sooner but that c)
the President can resume earlier with the appropriate acquiescence. The
structural reasoning behind this interpretation makes it even more
compelling. To construe the clause otherwise would allow a President who
authoritative decision-makers had declared disabled to unilaterally return
without any independent confirmation of his fitness, would allow him to
disrupt the Section 4 procedure by discharging Cabinet members, and would
increase the number of transfers of authority, thereby interfering with
presidential continuity. Many who have carefully studied this issue have

393
394

FEERICK, supra note 10, at 119.
See supra note 390.
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reached this same conclusion.395
III. CONCLUSION
The first fifty years of its history confirm what the framers of the Twentyfifth Amendment suspected. Section 4 is likely to be used rarely. Some
potential uses may not be controversial when, for instance, a President is
unconscious for a prolonged period of time.396 Yet, Section 4 was also
created to address the most challenging instances of presidential inability,
both contingencies its framers could foresee and those they could not
anticipate. They devised it to allow the transfer of presidential power and
duties to the Vice President when a physical, mental, or other circumstance
rendered the President incapacitated. They recognized that some
prospective uses of Section 4 might invite conflict, if, for instance, a President
suffers from a mental illness that makes him or her “unable to discharge the
powers and duties” of the presidency yet refuses to acknowledge that debility.
Section 4 exists to help ensure continuous presidential leadership during
perilous times by a legitimate President or Vice President who is able to
discharge the powers and duties of the presidency. It is, accordingly,
important that government officials and the public have a clear sense
regarding Section 4 to inform their thinking when occasion arises for its use,
especially if the circumstances present a contingency which invites conflict.
To the extent commentary and explainer articles improperly depict
Section 4 they may contribute to a misinformed public and government and
even provide material for demagogic leaders and their acolytes to misuse in
the future to complicate the process.

395

396

See, e.g., FEERICK, supra note 10, at 118–19; Gustafson, supra note 166, at 468–69 (stating that Vice
President remains in power during the four-day period); Second Fordham University School of Law
Clinic, supra note 7, at 925; RAYMOND J. CELADA, LIBRARY OF CONG. LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE
SERV., PRESIDENTIAL CONTINUITY AND VICE PRESIDENTIAL VACANCY AMENDMENT LRS-9
(1965) (“However, if the Vice President and a majority of the Cabinet felt that the President was
unable, they could prevent the President from resuming the powers and duties of the office by
transmitting their written declaration so stating to the Congress.”); id. at LRS-23 (“Pending the
decision [by Congress], the Vice President is to continue as Acting President.”); Joel Goldstein, Trump
Opponents Have Rediscovered the 25th Amendment. Here Is What You Should Know About It, WASH. POST (June
7, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/06/07/5-things-youshould-know-about-the-25th-amendment/?utm_term=.6eb478ccd9c0 (“The amendment and its
history make clear that the vice president continues to act as president during both the four-day
waiting period and the 21-day deliberation period” unless either the appropriate executive officials
or at least a house of Congress sooner supports the President’s position); cf. KALT, supra note 281, at
74 (concluding that Vice President is to remain in power during the four-day period).
See, e.g., Goldstein, supra note 224, at 196.
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The Twenty-fifth Amendment, including Section 4, was the product of a
lengthy effort to address gaps in America’s provisions to ensure presidential
continuity.397 The Amendment, especially Section 4, cannot be properly
appraised or grasped through a quick consideration. In addition to its text,
the historical context, legislative record and structural considerations must
be studied to appreciate it design, the purposes animating its provisions, the
way in which it is to operate, and the contribution it can make.
The Amendment, its architects conceded, is imperfect. They pursued it
nonetheless because they correctly concluded that it was an enormous
improvement on the status quo which, among other problems, impeded
action when a President was disabled. Its adoption represented an enormous
step forward. That becomes evident when its history and record are studied.
It is easy, as some have done, to disparage Section 4 as “ambiguous.” Yet,
greater precision would have made adoption less likely by inviting complaints
that its treatment of marginal matters was over-inclusive or under-inclusive.
Such a result would have left constitutional provisions in the unsatisfactory
state they were in, a status quo that was even less palatable during a nuclear
age. Of course, predictability has its appeal where possible, but life is full of
uncertainty and sometimes flexible formulations present the wiser course in
order to allow future decision-makers the ability to respond to problems that
may arise with unanticipated twists. The Amendment’s architects recognized
that defining presidential disability with a bright-line standard would
inevitably be too rigid to address unforeseen contingencies the future would
present. Rather than attempt an approach they suspected would prove
under-inclusive, they provided a standard with intended flexibility. On other
occasions, they deliberately fashioned extensive legislative history to clarify
various terms and procedures in the reasonable understanding that later
generations would consult and rely upon the purposes, understandings, and
meanings their preserved discussions disclosed.
Not all of the mistakes about Section 4 in journalistic literature are of equal
consequence. Some may be due to inelegant phrasing in short commentary
or explainer pieces or to word constraints that provide inadequate space to
cover a complicated subject rather than to substantive misunderstanding.
Those which misstate the scope of Section 4, by suggesting that it does not
apply to mental disabilities or that it only applies when the President is unable
to communicate an inability, are more serious distortions. Although the
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See, e.g., FEERICK, supra note 10, at 49–121 (providing historical discussion of development of the
Amendment); Goldstein, supra note 9, at 963–68, 998–1013 (discussing context and legislative
efforts that gave rise to the Amendment); Goldstein, supra note 104, at 1138–40 (discussing
Amendment as example of bipartisan legislative achievement).
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provision was not intended as a means to declare no confidence in a President
simply because his policies were unpopular, it was intended to cover a wide
variety of situations in which the constitutional decision-makers found him
unable to discharge presidential powers and duties given the context
presented. Similarly, mischaracterizations regarding who exercises power
during the four-day period are potentially serious. The text, the legislative
record and structural arguments together make clear that the Vice President
exercises powers during the four-day period. Nonetheless, an unprincipled
politician might attempt that argument and he or she and their journalistic
acolytes might draw from mistakes previously made on the Internet.
A careful study of the legislative record would avoid many mistakes
regarding Section 4. That is certainly true of the statements that diminished
the role of presidential inability in the Amendment, suggested that mental
inability was not a focus, excluded from coverage situations where a
conscious President was unwilling to declare her inability, questioned who
were the “principal heads of the executive departments,” or concluded that
the President would resume power immediately based on his or her “no
inability” declaration.
Of course, it is a rare journalist who has the time to study the three sets
of legislative hearings and the Senate and House debates (not to mention the
relevant history before 1964) before writing a 750-word commentary or
explainer piece about whether Section 4 could be invoked against President
Trump or any other President. They might fairly rely on scholarly experts
on the subject to provide background regarding the Amendment.
And it is surely too much to expect every academic to study the full
legislative materials before producing his or her own commentary piece,
much less responding to a journalist’s phone call or e-mail. Experts on the
presidency, on American politics or history or constitutional law, or other
subjects may enhance public discussion of the applicability of Section 4 by
the insights their scholarship in related fields allows them to contribute even
if they have not written or taught about the Twenty-fifth Amendment. Many
who have contributed to the discussion have accordingly deepened the
discussion. Yet, most of the mistakes addressed here could have been
avoided by anyone who read the pertinent pages of either John Feerick’s The
Twenty-fifth Amendment: Its Complete History and Applications or his 1965 Fordham
Law Review article explaining the Amendment. It does not seem too much to
expect someone writing or commenting on the Amendment to have at least
consulted that classic work before offering expert analysis.
When mistakes are made, it is worth correcting them to avoid later
confusion. Some articles regarding Section 4 acknowledge having made
mistakes and have corrected them. Although initial readers may be
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misinformed, one advantage of modern technology is that the permanent
digital version can carry a correction with the article in question. Whereas
mistakes in printed media remained forever and the subsequent corrections
were often hard to connect, error can now be acknowledged and eliminated
so that only the corrected version endures. Scholars can play a constructive
role by calling these mistakes to the attention of the author or platform. My
few efforts in this regard suggest that sometimes they are appreciated (and
other times ignored).
Ultimately, Section 4 may present some difficult questions, including
instances where people in good faith reach different conclusions. That is
inevitable. It is hoped, however, that such discussions will proceed with an
appreciation of the contribution Section 4 and the rest of the Twenty-fifth
Amendment have made and the challenges its architects faced, and an
understanding of Section 4’s history, scope, and operation. That, after all,
should be among the takeaways of its golden jubilee.

